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Essays on Taxation, Economic Growth and Fluctuations
Abstract
The rst chapter studies the stabilizing role of scal policy. We particularly empha-
size the role played by the assumption on the use of public expenditure. We nd that
if wasteful government expenditure is assumed in a two sector growth model then pro-
gressive taxation prevails as a stabilizer of belief-driven uctuations. In an one-sector
model, we observe that when a lump-sum transfer is introduced a stabilizing role for
regressive income taxation emerges. In addition, we show that with a lump-sum trans-
fer it turns out that the labour and capital income taxes serve in a di¤erent way to
dampen belief-driven uctuations. This di¤erence between labour and capital income
taxes can also be observed in a growth model with productive government spending.
The second chapter demonstrates the optimality of intertemporally-regressive tax-
ation in a Barro-type growth model with decreasing-returns-to-scale and a public con-
sumption good. The constant tax rate that achieves the rst-best steady-state decen-
tralizes an excessive rate of growth with lower welfare than the rst-best. We nd that
the use of regressive taxation moves the growth rate closer to that of the rst-best, and
the optimum tax matches the rst-best growth path to a rst-order approximation.
In the third chapter, we introduce quasi-hyperbolic preferences into the growth
model with productive public spending. First, we compare the competitive equilib-
rium with the rst-best equilibrium in a centrally-planned economy. Second, we ex-
plore second-best taxation using the Ramsey scal policy approach with three di¤erent
degrees of commitment: full commitment, complete absence of commitment, and one-
period partial commitment.
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1 Introduction to the Thesis
The theory of scal policy involves so many aspects of economics. Among them, this
thesis particularly pays attention to two aspects of scal policy. In a micro-economic
perspective, it concerns taxation or public nance issues which seek an e¢ cient resource
allocation that is not reached by the competitive equilibrium due to various market
failures. When there is no market failure, the competitive equilibrium has no problem in
attaining a Pareto-optimal resource allocation without the need to resort to government
intervention. However, with market failure, the fundamental welfare theorem does not
apply so the competitive market equilibrium loses its Pareto-optimality. For this reason,
the government should correct the ine¢ cient competitive outcome with various scal
instruments including distortionary taxation, public goods, and sometimes debts. The
optimal composition of these instruments to regain e¢ ciency in the "Laissez-faire"
economy is the main interest in this part.
In a macro-economic view, scal policy concerns the stabilization of economic uc-
tuations. Traditionally the usefulness of scal policy as a macroeconomic management
tool has been challenged for various reasons. Discretionary scal intervention, in par-
ticular, has long been criticized in that it has not contributed to economic stability or
has even caused more instability (Fatas and Mihov, 2003) in some cases mainly due
to the time-lag in the decision-making process. On the contrary, automatic stabilizers
which are operated by the counter-cyclical rule embeded in various scal instruments
such as a progressive income tax or unemployment benets are relatively free from crit-
icism. In fact, it has recently been shown that automatic stabilizers have been working
successfully in the most of the developed economies where the balanced-budget rule
is managed in a medium-run (Fatas and Mihov, 2012). In these countries, automatic
stabilizers are operated by counter-cyclical budget balance as the tax rate is progressive
and government spending is maintained at a stable level. Gali (1994) earlier suggested
a possibility in a RBC model that automatic stabilizers built into distortionary taxes
with a continuous balanced-budget rule can destabilize the economy by providing pro-
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cyclical public spending, but it turned out that empirical data does not support the
predictions of the model.
This thesis consists of three distinct chapters ranging across these two issues. The
rst chapter deals with the stabilizing role of the scal policy. Traditional studies about
stabilizing scal policy have been concerned with the economic uctuations resulting
from the intrinsic shocks or shocks that inuence economic fundamentals such as endow-
ments, preferences, or production technologies. In contrast, the business cycle that this
chapter aims to tackle is a type of economic uctuation that arises endogenously due to
the existence of a sunspot equilibrium. In the seminal work of Cass and Shell (1983),
sunspot equilibrium refers to the situation where the purely extrinsic uncertainty can
have real e¤ects on economic outcomes. In a sunspot equilibrium, even if uncertainty
about all fundamental variables is excluded, there still remains the volatility in the
economy which can be interpreted as the contribution of extrinsic uncertainty, whether
it be market psychology such as waves of pessimism or optimism or animal spirits as
Keynes named it.
In the context of dynamic general equilibrium, the existence of indeterminate equi-
librium provides the mechanism where the sunspot uctuations occur. In addition to
its contribution on the variety of the source of economic uctuations, indeterminacy in
the dynamic economic model provides a plausible explanation for the stylized fact that
economies that have seemingly identical economic fundamentals follow di¤erent growth
paths. Palivos et al (2003), for example, paid attention to this aspect of indetermi-
nacy and showed that scal policy can be used as a selection device among multiple
equilibria.
For the study of the Keynesian scal response to address the business cycles aris-
ing from indeterminacy, we follow the tradition of standard real business cycles (RBC)
models suggested by Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996)1. In this strand, an increasing-
returns-to-scale technology is critical in the mechanism which induces indeterminacy.
1A monetary economy based on Woodford (1986) and Grandmont et al (1998) has also commonly
used in literature.
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The policy recommendations from this RBC literature, however, are mixed. In Guo
and Lansing (1998), they argue that progressive income tax can stabilize sunspot uc-
tuations in the one-sector growth model with increasing returns. This result is also
conrmed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) where regressive income tax causes in-
determinacy. On the contrary, Guo and Harrison (2001) drew the conclusion that pro-
gressive taxation makes an economy more susceptible to indeterminacy in a two-sector
growth model. In a case where government productive public spending is the source
of indeterminacy as in Guo and Harrison (2008) and Kamiguch and Tamai (2011),
Chen and Guo (2010) also show that regressive taxation can reduce the probability of
indeterminacy.
The rst chapter starts with an e¤ort to settle the contradictory results in one-sector
and two-sector growth model. We take notice of the di¤erence in assumptions on the
use of public expenditure. Guo and Lansing (1998) assume that public expenditure
does not provide any service to the private sector. In contrast, the tax revenue in Guo
and Harrison (2001) is assumed to be repaid as lump-sum transfer to the agents. We
nd that if we maintain the wasteful government expenditure assumption in the two
sector growth model of Benhabib and Farmer (1998) progressive taxation prevails as a
stabilizer of belief-driven uctuations.
We also revisit the one-sector growth model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), observ-
ing that when wasteful government expenditure assumption in Guo and Lansing (1998)
is changed stabilizing role for regressive income taxation emerges. In addition, we show
that with a lump-sum transfer it turns out that the labour and capital income taxes
serve in a di¤erent way to dampen belief-driven uctuations. This di¤erence between
labour and capital income tax can also be observed in a growth model with productive
government spending in Guo and Harrison (1998) and Chen and Guo (2010).
The second and third chapters study two types of market failures and the optimal
taxation polocy to address them. In the second chapter, we explore optimal taxation in
a growth model with productive government spending and public consumption goods.
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The existence of public goods in our model causes the competitive economy not to obtain
a Pareto-optimal economic outcome, so the objective of this chapter is to nd an optimal
tax mix to implement the rst-best outcome of a central planner in a decentralized
economy.
Most of the literature concerning growth models with productive public spending
starting from Barro (1990) assumes that the contribution of the public expenditure is
su¢ ciently large as to create a balanced growth path. This assumption has great merit
in that the economy has no transition dynamics so that the comparison of welfare
is straightforward. In Barro (1990), it is shown that it is optimal that productive
government spending should be nanced with a lump-sum tax, with income being left
untaxed. This result generally holds when the labour is endogenized (Turnovsky,2000)
or the model is extended to an open economy (Turnovsky, 1996c and 1999) or public
consumption is introduced in the utility function (Turnovsky, 1996a). Since Futagami et
al (1993), some literature has considered productive public spending as a stock variable
rather than a ow variable as in Barro (1990) and it has been shown that the existence
of a balanced-growth path and the optimality of non-income tax result also hold. The
role of distortionary income tax emerges when the government fails to set the level of
public spending at the optimum or factors such as congestion and adjustment costs are
considered. But, even when an income tax is needed, a constant tax rate is enough to
implement the rst-best in the competitive economy.
The model in the second chapter basically follows Barro (1990) except for the
decreasing-returns-to-scale technology with respect to private capital and productive
public spending. We also include an endogenous labour choice and public consumption
in consumer utility. We characterize the rst-best optimum chosen by a central planner
and then try to construct a tax policy that replicates this optimum in a competitive
economy. Due to decreasing returns, our economy shows transitional dynamics and we
show that constant income tax rate cannot implement the rst-best outcome along the
growth path. So we introduce a non-linear income tax and nd that an intertempo-
11
rally regressive income tax schedule is required to generate a growth path close to the
rst-best optimum.
The third chapter studies time-inconsistent preferences as a source of market fail-
ure. Economic models typically assume that the agents discount their future utility
in an exponential fashion, which conveniently precludes the occurrence of preference
reversals. However, a large literature studying behavioural anomalies such as Ainslie
(1992) and Lowenstien and Prelec (1992) and even our real-life experience indicate that
the actual discount function is more concave than an exponential curve, so that it pro-
duces dynamic inconsistency. The topic of dynamic inconsistency in economics has a
long tradition as the rst analysis can be traced back to David Hume and Adam Smith
(Palacios-Huerta, 2003) and the contribution of Strotz (1956) and the increasingly so-
phisticated analysis of his model by Pollak (1968), Peleg and Yarri (1973), and Gold-
man (1980) have been provided a novel approach to the issue where the decision-making
process of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences is interpreted as an intrapersonal
game among di¤erent temporal selves.
Time-inconsistency is captured in our model by quasi-hyperbolic preferences follow-
ing Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1996). Laibson (1996) shows that quasi-
hyperbolic preferences induce a non-Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium so that it
creates a market failure. In a standard Ramsey growth model, Krusell et al (2002)
also show that the competitive equilibrium is not e¢ cient. In addition, they point out
that if the central planner inherits the quasi-hyperbolic preferences the cost of time-
inconsistency is even larger, so that the rst-best chosen by this planner leads to a
worse-o¤ outcome than competitive equilibrium.
Extending Krusell et al (2002), the third chapter embraces quasi-hyperbolic prefer-
ences into a growth model with productive public spending. Since there exists external-
ity from public spending, the result of Krusell et al (2002) that laissez-faire equilibrium
outperforms the planned equilibrium does not hold. So we focus on the di¤erence that
quasi-hyperbolic preferences make in the optimal tax policy.
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First, we compare the competitive equilibriumwith the rst-best choice in a centrally-
planned economy. When a lump-sum tax is available the tax policy that can implement
the rst-best in a decentralized economy has a zero capital income tax rate, which is not
the case in a standard Ramsey growth model. We also observe that quasi-hyperbolic
preferences result in failure of the rst-best choice to attain Pareto-e¢ ciency. A bet-
ter resource allocation than the rst-best choice can be accomplished with a negative
capital income tax rate (a subsidy to capital income).
Second, we explore second-best taxation from the Ramsey scal policy approach
with three di¤erent degrees of commitment, when a lump-sum tax is not available. Un-
der full commitment, when labour supply is inelastic, it is optimal for the government
to levy a negative capital tax rate, while a positive capital tax rate which should be
larger for more impatient consumers is the second-best choice when labour supply is
endogenous. In the complete absence of commitment, we observe a continuum of opti-
mal tax policies in the xed labour case, and a bad equilibrium where the government
conscates all of capital income so that no agent saves in the elastic labour case. Fi-
nally, under one-period partial commitment, we nd that a zero capital income tax rate
is restored in the inelastic labour case and a positive capital tax rate, which is higher
than the full commitment case, should be levied in the elastic labour case.
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2 Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stability
2.1 Indeterminacy in a Two-sector Growth Model and Pro-
gressive Taxation
2.1.1 Introduction
Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996) have shown that the introduction of an increasing-
returns-to-scale technology in a standard real-business-cycles model could allow the in-
determinacy of equilibrium to arise under empirically plausible parameter values. These
studies have provided the foundation for studying the role of Keynesian-type policy in-
terventions to address the economic uctuations which would solely be caused by the
existence of indeterminacy. In the one-sector growth model with increasing returns of
Benhabib-Farmer (1994), Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999) have claimed that
progressive income taxation could e¤ectively be used to eliminate the indeterminacy
and restore saddle-path stability. On the contrary, in the two-sector model with sector-
specic externalities of Guo and Farmer (1996), the conclusion of the study of Guo and
Harrison (2001) gives the opposite stabilizing tax policy implication to the one-sector
case. That is, in a two-sector model, when the externality is su¢ ciently large, then a
regressive income tax schedule could work as a stabilizer and more progressive taxation
just leads the economy to be more susceptible to the indeterminacy. The study of Sims
(2005) was also based on the two-sector model of Benhabib and Farmer (1996) and in
this case he considered di¤erent tax schemes which are levied separately on labour and
capital income. What Sims (2005) found in his study is that only progressive taxation
could be e¤ective in reducing the likelihood of indeterminacy, which quite contrasts
with the result of Guo and Harrison (2001).
So it is very natural to question what makes the results of these two literatures
di¤erent even though they are basically based on the same model. That is what this
work aims to do. There are three di¤erences in the model descriptions. Firstly, as
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mentioned above, while Guo and Harrison (2001) considered a tax on total income,
Sims (2005) assumed that the tax is levied separately on wages and capital income.
Secondly, Guo and Harrison (2001) assume a di¤erent externality for each sector, but
in Sims (2005), the sectoral externality is assumed to be equal. Finally, as is claried
later in Guo and Harrison (2012), Guo and Harrison (2001) assume that the tax revenue
is repaid to households in the form of a lump-sum transfer while Sims (2005) maintains
the wasteful government spending assumption in Guo and Lansing (1998).
To nd out whether these three factors could explain the di¤erence in results, I will
apply the approach described in Sims (2005) to the case of a tax on total income with
di¤erent sectoral externalities and see if it can provide the same result as Guo and
Harrison (2001). The results show that the assumption about how the governments
tax revenue is used plays a very critical role in choosing an appropriate tax schedule
to dampen belief-driven uctuations in the economy. When the tax revenue is used
to nance government spending which does not contribute to either production or
household utility, only progressive income tax can be used to secure the saddle-path
stability of the economy. By contrast, when the tax revenue is repaid as a lump-sum
transfer, the stabilizing role of the regressive income taxation emerges when sector-
specic externalities are su¢ ciently large as concluded in Guo and Harrison (2001). It
turns out that whether the income tax is levied separately on labour and capital income
and whether the sectoral externality is assumed to be the same for the consumption
good sector and the investment good sector do not a¤ect the conclusion.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The next part will describe the basic
model, most of which is based on the model suggested by Benhabib and Farmer (1996).
The third part will characterize the steady-state equilibrium and dene the stability
condition of the steady-state equilibrium with the determinant and trace of the Jacobian
matrix. This part will also briey address what would happen to the stability condition
when the sectoral externalities are assumed to be di¤erent and we will also present the
results of numerical exercises to see the e¤ect of changes in the parameter values on
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the stability of the dynamic system. In addition, the macroeconomic dynamics under
the assumption of a lump-sum transfer will be compared with the case of wasteful
government spending. Concluding remarks will be presented in the last sub-section.
2.1.2 Model
Private Technology In Benhabib and Farmer (1996), it is assumed that there are
two sectors producing consumer goods, C, and investment goods, I. Each sector
faces its own constant-returns-to-scale technology
C = A(LL)
a(KK)
b; I = B(f1  LgL)a(f1  KgK)b; a+ b = 1; (1)
whereK and L represent economy-wide capital and labour input and K and L denote
the fractions of capital and labour used to produce consumer goods. Now normalize
the price of investment goods to 1 and denote the price of consumer goods by p. The
rst-order conditions for prot maximization in each sector are
pbC
KK
=
bI
f1  KgK
= r;
paC
LL
=
aI
f1  LgL
= w; (2)
where r and w represent economy-wide factor prices for capital and labour. From (2),
we can notice the fact that K = L = . Then (1) can be rewritten as
I + (
B
A
)C = I + pC = BLaKb  Y . (3)
Equation (3) describes the production possibilities frontier, the ppf, which has a linear
form for a private rm (Benhabib and Farmer, 1996).
Social Technology Scaling coe¢ cients for each sector, A and B, are dened as
A = (L L)
a(K K)
b La Kb; (4)
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B = (f1  LgL)a(f1  Kg K)b La Kb; (5)
where variables with a bar denote economy-wide averages, which are assumed as given
to each private rm. In this form, externalities arise from two sources: an aggregate
labour and capital externality represented by  and ; and a sector-specic externality
by . If  equals zero, i.e. there is no sector-specic externality, the model corresponds
to one sector growth model in Benhabib and Farmer (1994). Since identical rms are
assumed, it holds that K = L =  and K = K, L = L:
C = (1+)La(1++)Kb(1++) = LK; (6)
I = f1  g(1+)La(1++)Kb(1++) = f1  gLK; (7)
where  = 1 + ,  = a(1 +  + ) and  = b(1 +  + ). Previous results lead to the
social production possibilities frontier, the social ppfas
C
1
 + I
1
 = L

K

 :
(Benhabib and Farmer, 1996)
Government Sector Following Guo and Lansing (1998), the government is assumed
to nance its expenditure with an income tax schedules,  that has the form
 = 1   (Y
Y
);
where Y represents the steady-state level of output for the economy. The parameter
 shows the level of the income tax schedule which has income tax rate, 1    at the
steady-state of the economy. The progressivity of the tax schedule depends on the value
of parameter . The progressivity of the income tax schedule can be explained by the
relationship between the average income tax rate () and the marginal income tax rate
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(m) which is dened as
m =
@(Y )
@Y
= 1   (1  )(Y
Y
) =  +  (
Y
Y
):
If  is greater than zero, the income tax can be said to be progressive since the marginal
tax rate is greater than the average tax rate. When  = 0, the income tax has a constant
tax schedule. For negative values of , the income tax rate shows a regressive property
as it decreases as the tax base expands. Both  and m are assumed to be less than 1
to exclude the case where the government conscates all of the income or there is no
incentive for the consumer to save and work. In addition, the marginal after-tax interest
rate, (1  m)r; is assumed to be decreasing in K. Summarising these restrictions, we
impose a boundary on  and  as
0 <   1,    1

<  < 1.
Since the government is assumed to be implementing a balanced-budget rule, govern-
ment expenditure, G, is
G = Y: (8)
This government spending does not provide any services to private production or utility.
Consumer Problem The representative consumer is assumed to choose a consump-
tion and labour bundle for each time to solve the present value utility maximization
problem
max
Z 1
0
U(C;L)e tdt; (9)
where  is discount rate reecting time-preference of the consumer. The utility function,
U(C;L) is given by
U(C;L) = lnC   L
1+
1 + 
; (10)
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where C and L are the consumption and labour supply choice of the individual consumer
and  denotes the inverse of the labour supply elasticity. Each consumer earns his
income,
wL+ rK = pC + I = Y; (11)
in return for providing capital and labour to the production process. Since the gov-
ernment has its own demand for goods from government expenditure, G, we should
consider the composition of this government spending. For convenience, we assume
that the government only demands the investment good. Then the investment good
production should cover the government expenditure, G and the demand from the pri-
vate sector for the capital accumulation, _K + K where  is depreciation rate so that
I = _K + K +G: (12)
Using (11), (12) and (8), the budget constraint of the consumer can be expressed as
_K = (1  )BLaKb   pC   K:
We can construct the Hamiltonian as
H(C;L;K;) = lnC   (1 + ) 1L1+ + f(1  )BLaKb   pC   Kg;
where  is the co-state variable associated with the law of motion for capital. The
rst-order conditions for this problem can be written as
@H
@C
= 0() 1
C
= p; (13)
@H
@L
= 0, L = (1  ) (Y
Y
)aBLa 1Kb; (14)
@H
@K
=   _()
_

= (+ )  (1  ) (Y
Y
)bBLaKb 1; (15)
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_K =  Y

Y 1    pC   K; (16)
with transversality condition, limt!1e tK = 0.
2.1.3 Analysis of Dynamics
Equilibrium and Stability Condition In a symmetric equilibrium, every consumer
makes the same choice, so thatK = K, L = L and  = . Then we dene a new variable
S = 1= á la Benhabib and Farmer (1996), and from (2) and (3), it can be shown that
BLaKb = pC + I = S=. Using this, equation (15) and (16) can be rewritten as
_

= (+ )  (1  ) (Y )
bS1 
1 K
; (17)
_K
K
=
 ( Y )S1 
1 K
  1
K
  : (18)
Letting  = log , k = logK; and s = logS, these two equations can be expressed as
_ = (+ )  (1  ) (Y )be(1 )s (1 ) k; (19)
_k =  (Y )e(1 )s (1 ) k   e  k   : (20)
If the variable s could be dened as a function of  and k, the dynamic system described
above could be understood as a two-dimensional system of di¤erential equations with
respect to  and k. From (6), S can be newly dened as
S =
L

K


C
1
v
; (21)
and A and B in (4) and (5) can be rewritten using S as
A =
L aK b
Sv 1
=
1
(S   1)v 1B:
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Then, from (13) and (14), C can be expressed using S and  as
C =
1
(S   1)v 1 ;
L+1 = a(1  ) (Y )S1 
Using these two expressions, equation (21) can be transformed to be a function of S, 
and K as
(S   1)1 vSv  (1 )1+ = [a(1  ) (Y )] 1+ 1++1K: (22)
From the implicit function (22), we can dene the partial derivatives of s(; k) with
respect to  and k; denoted as s and sk by
@s
@
= s =

1+
+ 1
v   (1 )
1+
+ (1  v) S
S 1
;
@s
@k
= sk =

v   (1 )
1+
+ (1  v) S
S 1
=
 


1+
+ 1
!
s.
Now the Jacobian, J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA, for the dynamic system (19) and (20) can be
derived as
J11 = (1  )2 (Y )b(1  s)e(1 )s (1 ) k;
J12 = (1  ) (Y )b[1  (1  )sk]e(1 )s (1 ) k;
J21 = e
  k   (1  ) (Y )(1  s)e(1 )s (1 ) k;
J22 = e
  k    (Y )[1  (1  )sk]e(1 )s (1 ) k:
At the steady-state, Y = BeLa eKb = eS=e = ees e, where variables with a tilda
represent steady-state values. Putting the steady-state value of Y into equations (17)
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and (18), three conditions can be derived:
ees e ek = + 
b (1  ) ;
e 
e ek = + f1  b(1  )g
b(1  ) ,
ees = eS = + 
 [+ f1  b(1  )g] .
The previous results lead us to a Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state:
Js:s11 = (1  )(1  es)(+ );
Js:s12 = [1  (1  )bes](+ );
Js:s21 =
[1  (1  )(1  es)]
b(1  ) (+ )  ;
Js:s22 =
(+ )
b
bes   ;
where es = 1++1
v  (1 )
1+
+(1 v) eSeS 1
, esk = 
v  (1 )
1+
+(1 v) eSeS 1
; and b = 
1+
+1
. This Jacobian
now yields a trace and a determinant given by
Tr(J) =
+ 
b
nb   b(1  )oes + b f(1  )  g
+ 

; (23)
Det(J) =
(+ )2
b

1
1    
b
+ 
 h
(1  )(b   1)es   i . (24)
It can be easily checked that when  = 0 and  = 1, i.e. there is no tax,
es = 1
v   
1+
+ (1  v) eSeS 1
; esk = 
v   
1+
+ (1  v) eSeS 1
= es;
T r(J) =
+ 
b

(   b)es + b
+ 

; Det(J) =
(+ )2
b

1  b
+ 

(   1)es;
which exactly correspond to the results from Benhabib and Farmer (1996).
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The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix dened in (23) and (24) deter-
mine the stability properties of the dynamic system described by (19) and (20). Firstly,
since the system has one pre-determined variable, kt , the necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition for the system to have a saddle-path equilibrium is that the two eigenvalues
of the Jacobian should have opposite signs to each other, which corresponds to the
condition that the determinant should have a negative value. The system will show
multiple equilibria if and only if both eigenvalues have negative real parts so that the
trace would be negative with the determinant being positive. The nal case is that
with no equilibrium path, where any deviation from the steady-state would result in
divergence. This arises if and only if both the determinant and the trace are positive.
A Case with Di¤erent Sectoral Externalities The model discussed so far has
assumed that the consumer good sector and the investment good sector have the same
sectoral externality, . However, Harrison (2001) discovered that indeterminacy could
arise even when only the investment good sector has a certain amount of externality. If
the assumption that the sector has a di¤erent externality factors denoted as c and I ;
is added to the previous model, the scaling coe¢ cient in (4) and (5) can be redened
as
A = (L L)
aC (K K)
bC La Kb;
B = (f1  LgL)aI (f1  Kg K)bI La Kb,
and the production functions for the consumer and investment sectors would be written
as
C = (1+C)La(1+C+)Kb(1+C+) = vCLCKC ; (25)
I = f1  g(1+I)La(1+I+)Kb(1+I+) = f1  gvILIKI , (26)
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where vc = 1+C ; vI = 1+I ; C = a(1+C+); C = b(1+C+); I = a(1+I+);
C = b(1 + I + ). From (25), S(1=) can be redened as
S =
L
C
vC K
C
vC
C
1
vC
.
Using the fact that A = vC 1LC aKC b and B = f1  gvI 1LI aKI b,
p =
B
A
= (S   1)vI 1SvC vILI CKI C . (27)
Since the consumer still faces the same utility maximization problem as dened in (9),
equations (13) and (14) still hold in this case, leading to the results
C =
1
(S   1)vI 1SvC vILI CKI C ;
L+1 = a(1  ) (Y )S1 :
With these results, equation (27) can be transformed as an implicit function of S, 
and K as
(S   1)1 vISvI  (1 )I+1 = [a(1  ) (Y )] I1+ I1++1KI .
From this function, the partial derivatives of s(; k) with respect to  and k calculated
at the steady-state can be newly dened as
s^ =
I
1+
+ 1
vI   (1 )I1+ + (1  vI)
eSeS 1
; (28)
bsk = 
vI   (1 )I1+ + (1  vI)
eSeS 1
=
 

I
1+
+ 1
!
s^. (29)
From (28) and (29), it is noticeable that these values of the partial derivatives only
depend on the degree of externality of the investment good sector. Therefore, even
though it is assumed that c 6= I , this dynamic system has exactly the same dynamic
24
properties to the case with same sectoral externalities only if  = I . This independency
from the consumer sector externality corresponds to the result of Harrison (2001), where
it was pointed out that this feature would result from the logarithmic utility function
assumption.
Results from Benchmark Parameterization In this sub-section, we will present
some results from a numerical exercise using the calibrated parameters in Benhabib
and Farmer (1996), where the capital share of national income, b, is set at 0.3, so the
share of labour, a, is chosen to be 0.7. The discount factor,  and the depreciation
rate of capital,  are xed at 0.05 and 0.1. The aggregate externality levels,  and ,
are both set equal to zero. As a start, the rst numerical experiment is implemented
for a case with no tax. The result is shown in Figure 1-(a) which displays the same
area of indeterminacy in the    space as Benhabib and Farmer (1996, p433). Figure
1-(b) is the result of a case with a at income tax schedule. The graph is drawn
in the same     space as Figure 1-(a) and it can easily be noted that the area in
which the indeterminacy can arise is signicantly reduced by the introduction of at
income tax. The consideration of a progressive feature in the income tax is shown in
Figure 1-(c) which shows that progressive taxation can reduce the parameter space for
the indeterminacy even further. On the contrary, the economy is more likely to show
indeterminacy with the regressive income tax schedule as shown in Figure 1-(d).
To check the e¤ect of the at tax scheme on stability, Figure 1-(e) is drawn in the
    space under the xed sectoral externality,  = 0:108, which is the empirically
calibrated value for the U.S economy suggested in Guo and Harrison (2001). Even
though it is very unlikely that the indeterminacy occurs with this level of externality,
it can be seen that the economy can be moved from an indeterminate steady-state to
a determinate one by a at income tax schedule. Finally Figure 1-(f) shows the rela-
tionship between the degree of progressivity and indeterminacy. The parameter values
for  and  are deliberately chosen to be 0.8 and 0.25 for the purpose of comparison
with the result of Guo and Harrison (2001, p83). According to Figure 1-(f), unlike the
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conclusion of Guo and Harrison (2001), a more regressive income tax schedule makes
the economy more susceptible to the indeterminacy.
A Case with Transfers The previous analysis is based on the assumption that
government spending does not provide any service to the private sector as in Guo and
Lansing (1998). If we assume that tax revenue is repaid as lump-sum transfer to the
agents as in Guo and Harrison (2001), the dynamic system should be written as
_ = (+ )  (1  ) (Y )be(1 )s (1 ) k;
_k = es  k   e  k   :
The Jacobian, J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA of this system can be derived as
J11 = (1  )2 (Y )b(1  s)e(1 )s (1 ) k;
J12 = (1  ) (Y )b[1  (1  )sk]e(1 )s (1 ) k;
J21 = e
  k   (1  s)es  k;
J22 = e
  k   (1  sk)es  k:
At a steady-state, these three results hold:
es  k =
+ 
b (1  ) ;
e  k =
+ f1  b(1  ) g
b(1  ) ,
es = S =
+ 
+ f1  b(1  ) g .
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Figure 1: Results from Benchmark Parameterization
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Dynamics with or without transfer
where variables with a bar denote the steady-state value. Using these facts, the Jacobian
matrix evaluated at the steady-state can be obtained as
Js:s11 = (1  )(1  s)(+ );
Js:s12 = [1  (1  )bs](+ );
Js:s21 =
s(+ )
b(1  )   ;
Js:s22 =
(+ )
b(1  ) 
bs   ;
where s =

1+
+1
v  (1 )
1+
+(1 v) S
S 1
; b = 
1+
+1
:
Figure 2 displays the comparison of the stability of the steady-state in the presence
of lump-sum transfers with the case of wasteful government spending. With lump-sum
transfers, Figure 2-(a) shows that when the degree of the externality () is su¢ ciently
large determinacy can be obtained under a regressive tax schedule, which reproduces
the assertions from Guo and Harrison (2001). On the contrary, with the wasteful
government spending, only progressive taxation can secure determinacy regardless of
the magnitude of the externality as can be seen in Figure 2-(b).
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2.1.4 Concluding Remarks
This section, as opposed to Guo and Harrison (2001), shows that progressive taxation
can work as a stabilizer of economic uctuations caused by indeterminacy in a two-
sector growth model with sector-specic externalities. It also shows that this benet
of progressive taxation in a two sector model is possible when income tax is just levied
on total income, rather than levied separately on labour and capital income as in Sims
(2005). And the assumption of di¤erent sector-specic externalities turns out to make
no di¤erence to the results. One intriguing observation here is that unlike in the one-
sector case, a at tax can change the macroeconomic dynamics. As for the reason why
Guo and Harrison (2001) were in favour of regressive taxation as sunspot stabilizer,
we show that the assumption that the tax revenue is repaid as a lump-sum transfer in
Guo and Harrison (2001) is very critical for reaching that conclusion. In our model,
tax revenue nances government spending which is wasteful.
2.2 Indeterminacy in One-sector Growth model and Progres-
sive Taxation: Revisit
2.2.1 Introduction
In a one-sector growth model with increasing returns to scale, it is regarded as a well-
established conclusion that progressive income tax can mitigate business cycle uctua-
tions driven by the self-fullling expectations. The usefulness of this classic automatic
stabilizer even for belief-driven uctuations has been repeatedly assured in many pa-
pers such as Guo and Lansing (1998), Guo (1999), Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (1997) and
Christiano and Harrison (1998). Most of these papers supporting progressive taxation,
however, share the assumption that the government levies the income tax to nance
government expenditure but this expenditure is simply wasteful as it does not serve the
private sector at all. As we observed in the previous section, what we assume about the
use of tax revenue can make a very signicant di¤erence to conclusions about whether
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a progressive or a regressive income tax schedule should be adopted to suppress the
likelihood of indeterminacy.
In this section, we revisit the Benhabib-Farmer one-sector (1994) growth model
and reinvestigate the role of income tax progressivity in eliminating the indeterminate
equilibrium of an economy. The model we use here di¤ers from Guo and Lansing
(1998) in only one aspect. We amend the wasteful government expenditure assumption
and assume that the government provides a lump-sum transfer with its tax revenue.
With this change, we nd that the conclusion of Guo and Lansing (1998) is changed
signicantly. Not only progressive taxation but also su¢ ciently regressive taxation can
e¤ectively stabilize sunspot uctuations.
When we consider separate income taxes for labour and capital income as in Guo
(1999), we nd that the change in the assumption about the use of tax revenue can
also give us an insight about the role of the capital income tax which is not mentioned
in the previous literature. In Guo (1999), only progressive labour income taxation can
prevent the indeterminacy from arising, while there is no room for capital income tax
to be used. On the contrary, with lump-sum transfers, it turns out that the capital
income tax should be regressive to ensure the saddle-path stability.
The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. The second sub-section inves-
tigates the one-sector growth model with increasing-returns-to-scale (Benhabib and
Farmer, 1994) with income tax on total income and lump-sum transfers. In the third
sub-section, the income tax is assumed to be levied separately on labour and capital
income. The last sub-section concludes.
2.2.2 One-sector Growth Model with Tax on Total Income
Since the Benhabib-Farmer two-sector model (1996) embraces the one-sector model
as a special case, we construct our model from the set-up introduced in the previous
section. If we assume that there is only one good in the economy in the model in
the previous section, the private technology can be described with a Cobb-Douglas
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production function,
Y = BLaKb, a+ b = 1:
There is no sectoral externality so that  = 0, so if we suppose that  = , the scaling
coe¢ cient, B; is dened here as
B = La Kb;
where L and K are economy-wide average levels of labour and capital. In a symmetric
equilibrium, it holds that L = L and K = K. Then the aggregate production function
is given by
Y = LK; (30)
where  = a(1 + ) and  = b(1 + ).
The governments tax policy is the same as in the previous section. The government
chooses the income tax rate,  given by
 = 1   (Y
Y
);
where the level and slope parameters,  and  satises the condition that 0 <   1,
 1

<  < 1.
A Case with Wasteful Government Spending
We start this section by reviewing the result of Guo and Lansing (1998) where the
government implements a balanced-budget with the budget constraint, G = Y . Gov-
ernment spending, G is assumed to be wasteful. With the utility function in (10), the
representative consumer still faces the same optimization problem as (9) and has the
same rst-order conditions from (13) to (16). As shown in Guo and Lansing (1998),
the dynamic system derived from (15) and (16) can be rewritten with the logarithmic
transformation of variables, k = logK; y = log Y and c = logC; as
_c = b(1  ) Y e(1 )y k   (+ );
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_k =  Y

e(1 )y k   ec k   :
From (30) and (14),
y = l + k; (31)
(+ 1)l = log

a(1  ) Y 

+ (1  )y   c; (32)
where l = logL. Using these facts, the dynamic system can be rewritten as
_c = b(1  ) Y e0+1k+2c   (+ ); (33)
_k =  Y

e0+1k+2c   ec k   ; (34)
where
0 =
(1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) log

a(1  ) Y 

;
1 =
(+ 1) ((1  )  1) + (1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) ;
2 =   (1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) :
From (33) and (34) we can dene the steady-state values as
ey 
k =
(+ )
b(1  ) ;
ec 
k =
(+ )
b(1  )   ;
where variables with a bar denote steady-state values. Combining these results, the
Jacobian matrix of the system in (33) and (34) evaluated at the steady-state can be
derived as
J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA ;
where
J11 = 2(+ );
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J12 = 1(+ );
J21 =
(+ )
b(1  )(2   1) + ;
J22 =
(+ )
b(1  )(1 + 1)  :
If we maintain the imposition of a lower bound on , (1   )   1 < 0 which is a
condition that guarantees the after-tax return on capital is strictly decreasing in K, the
trace (T ) and the determinant (D) of this Jacobian give us a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the model to exhibit deterministic equilibrium as
(1  )  1 < : (35)
So, when an economy shows indeterminacy, saddle-path stability can be restored by
adding more progressivity (larger ) to the income tax schedule.
A Case with Lump-sum Transfers
In Guo and Lansing (1998), government tax revenue, or public purchases of the good,
is assumed to be thrown into the seawithout providing any services to the economy.
Now following Guo and Harrison (2001, 2013), we assume that tax revenue is returned
to the household as a lump-sum transfer (T ). While the consumers budget constraint
is changed, the rst-order conditions remain the same as long as the transfer is taken
as given by the consumer. The aggregate resource constraint is changed from (16) to
_K = Y   C   K: (36)
(15) and (36) constitute a dynamic system after logarithmic transformation given
by
_c = b(1  ) Y e(1 )y k   (+ );
_k = ey k   ec k   :
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Using (31) and (32), the dynamic system can be rewritten as
_c = b(1  ) Y e0+c1k+c2c   (+ ); (37)
_k = e0+
k
1k+
k
2c   ec k   ; (38)
where
0 =
(1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) log

a(1  ) Y 

;
c1 =
(+ 1) ((1  )  1) + (1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) ;
k1 =
(   1)(+ 1) + (1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) ;
c2 =  
(1  )
(+ 1)  (1  ) ;
k2 =  

(+ 1)  (1  ) :
It can be noticed that at the steady-state,
Y

e(1 )y k = (
Y
Y
)
Y
K
=
Y
K
= ey k;
and from (37) and (38), we can dene the steady-state values as
Y

e0+
c
1
k+2c = e0+
k
1
k+2c =
(+ )
b(1  ) ;
ec 
k =
(+ )
b(1  )   :
Combining these results, the Jacobian matrix of the system in (37) and (38) evaluated
at the steady-state can be derived as
J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA ;
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where
J11 = 
c
2(+ );
J12 = 
c
1(+ );
J21 =
(+ )
b(1  ) (
k
2   1) + ;
J22 =
(+ )
b(1  ) (
k
1 + 1)  :
The determinant of this Jacobian matrix is
D =   (+ )
2
b(1  ) 

+ 1  (1  ) +

(+ )2
b(1  )   (+ )

(+ 1)((1  )  1)
+ 1  (1  ) :
Suppose that there is indeterminacy with a at tax schedule so that D > 0 when
 = 0. If we add progressivity (positive ) large enough to satisfy the condition that
+ 1  (1  ) > 0, the sign of the determinant is changed from positive to negative
so that saddle-path stability is restored. Therefore, (35) is still a su¢ cient condition for
determinacy. However, it is not a necessary condition since the determinant also has
a negative value when a su¢ cient regressivity is imposed on the income tax schedule
even though + 1  (1  ) < 0.
Figure 3 displays the value of the determinant and the trace of the Jacobian matrix
under various levels of income tax progressivity2. In the case with wasteful government
spending, Figure 3-(a) shows that only positive  (progressive taxation) can guarantee
the negative determinant which is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for saddle-path
stability as Guo and Lansing (1998) stated. On the side of negative , the negative
determinant value can be observed only when the degree of regressivity is beyond the
lower bound of . On the contrary, under the consideration of the lump-sum transfer,
Figure 3-(b) shows that not only progressive taxation but also regressive taxation can
ensure a determinate equilibrium. The negative determinant value is observed in both
2For the other parameter values, it is assumed that a = 0:7; b = 0:3,  = 0:05,  = 0:1,  = 0:05,
 = 0:8 and  = 0:6.
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Figure 3: Use of Tax Revenue and Income Tax Progressivity
sides. The magnitude of the regressivity required for determinacy is fairly mild as it
exceeds the lower bound of .
2.2.3 One-sector Growth Model with Separate Tax on Labour and Capital
Income
Guo (1999) introduced separate labour and capital income taxes with di¤erent progres-
sivities into the one-sector growth model of Benhabib-Farmer (1994). The tax rates for
labour income ( l) and capital income ( k) are dened as
 l = 1   l(
wL
wtLt
)l ;  k = 1   k(
rK
rtKt
)k ; (39)
where the parameters  i and i represent the level and slope of the tax schedules
and variables with a bar denote the steady-state level which is taken as given by the
representative consumer. To ensure the existence of the steady-state, k is assumed to
be within the boundary where the after-tax marginal return on capital is decreasing in
K, which gives the condition that k 2

 1

; 1

. Again, we consider two cases in this
sub-section. The rst case assumes that government spending does not contribute to
either production or household utility. In the second case, the government repays the
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tax revenue to the household as a lump-sum transfer.
A Case with the Wasteful Government Spending
Under the tax schedule dened in (39), the current-value Hamiltonian for the problem
can be constructed as
H(Ct; Lt; Kt;t) = lnCt  L
1+
t
1 + 
+tf l(wL)
l (wtLt)
1 l+ k(rK)
k (rtKt)
1 k Kt Ctg:
The rst-order conditions for this problem are
1
Ct
= t; (40a)
Lt = t l(1  l)(
wL
wtLt
)lwt; (41)
 k(1  k)(
rK
rtKt
)krt    = t   _t; (42)
with transversality condition limt!1 e ttKt = 0: Since wtLt = aY and rtKt = bY , it
holds that
wL
wtLt
=
rK
rtKt
=
Y
Y
:
Using this fact, (41) and (42) can be expressed as
L+1t = ta l(1  l)Y lY 1 lt (43)
t
"
b k(1  k)Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
  
#
= t   _t: (44)
From these results, a system of two-dimensional di¤erential equations can be identied
as
_Ct
Ct
= b k(1  k)Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
  ( + ); (45)
_Kt
Kt
= a lY
l Y
1 l
t
Kt
+ b kY
k Y
1 k
t
Kt
  Ct
Kt
  : (46)
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In (45) and (46), the ratios of steady-states variables, capital ( K), consumption ( C)
and output ( Y ) are dened by
Y
K
=
( + )
b k(1  k)
;
C
K
=
a l + b k
b k(1  k)
( + )  :
With the logarithm transformation, the system of (45) and (46) can be described as
_kt = a lY
le(1 l)yt kt + b kY
ke(1 k)yt kt   ect kt   ; (48)
_ct = b k(1  k)Y ke(1 k)yt kt   ( + ): (49)
Using the fact that y = l+ k and l =
ln
h
a l(1 l)Y l
i
+1
+ 1 l
+1
y  1
+1
c from (43), it can
be obtained that
y =
 ln
h
a l(1  l)Y l
i
+ 1  (1  l)
  
+ 1  (1  l)
c+
(+ 1)
+ 1  (1  l)
k: (50)
By putting (50) into the system of (48) and (49), the dynamic system can nally be
dened with logarithmically transformed variables as
_kt = a lY
le0+1kt+2ct + b kY
ke0+1kt+2ct   ect kt   ; (51)
_ct = b k(1  k)Y kee
0+1kt+2ct   ( + ); (52)
where
0 =
(1  l) ln
h
a l(1  l)Y l
i
+ 1  (1  l)
;
1 =
(+ 1) ((1  l)  1) + (1  l)
+ 1  (1  l)
;
2 =  
(1  l)
+ 1  (1  l)
;
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0 =
(1  k) ln
h
a l(1  l)Y l
i
+ 1  (1  l)
;
1 =
(+ 1) ((1  k)  1) + (1  l)
+ 1  (1  l)
;
2 =   (1  k)
+ 1  (1  l)
:
Then the Jacobian matrix (J) of the dynamic system of (51) and (52) evaluated at
the steady-state has the following form :
J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA ;
J11 =
( + )
b k(1  k)
((1 + 1)a l + (1 + 1)b k)  ;
J12 =
( + )
b k(1  k)
((2   1)a l + (2   1)b k) + ;
J21 = 1( + );
J22 = 2( + ):
Figure 4 displays the dynamic properties of the steady-state captured by the de-
terminant and the trace values of the Jacobian matrix under various progressivities of
the capital and labour income taxes. The parameter values except the progressivity
parameters, k and l are set to show indeterminacy when both income taxes are at.
The level of the labour and capital income taxes,  k and  l are the same here. Figure
4-(a) shows the case where the labour income tax is at (l = 0) and the capital income
tax can have various progressivity, k. As it shows, if the government can only vary
the progressivity of the capital income tax, neither progressive nor regressive capital
income tax can help to restore saddle-path stability. On the contrary, in a case where
the government implements a at capital income taxation (k = 0) and changes the
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Figure 4: Income tax progressivity and stability: without transfer
progressivity of the labour income tax, l, Figure 4-(b) shows that the determinate
equilibrium can be secured by progressive labour income taxation. This result is a
mere reiteration of the ndings in Guo (1999).
Analysis of Dynamics in a Case with a Lump-sum Transfer
If we consider the lump-sum transfer (TRt) in the households budget constraint as
_K =  l(wL)
l (wtLt)
1 l +  k(rK)
k (rtKt)
1 k   Kt   Ct + TRt;
the corresponding dynamic system can be identied as
_Ct
Ct
= b k(1  k)Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
  ( + ); (54)
_Kt
Kt
=
Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
  : (55)
From (54) to (55), the ratio variables of steady-states capital ( K), consumption ( C)
and output ( Y ) are dened by
Y
K
=
( + )
b k(1  k)
;
40
C
K
=
( + )
b k(1  k)
  :
In logarithm terms, the dynamic system of (54) to (55) is summarized as
_kt = e
0+1kt+2ct   ect kt   ; (57)
_ct = b k(1  k)Y kee
1+2kt+2ct   ( + ); (58)
where
0 =
 ln
h
a l(1  l)Y l
i
+ 1  (1  l)
;
1 =
(   1)(+ 1) + (1  l)
+ 1  (1  l)
;
2 =  

+ 1  (1  l)
;
0 =
(1  k) ln
h
a l(1  l)Y l
i
+ 1  (1  l)
;
1 =
(+ 1) ((1  k)  1) + (1  l)
+ 1  (1  l)
;
2 =   (1  k)
+ 1  (1  l)
:
Then the Jacobian matrix (J) of the dynamic system of (57) to (58) evaluated at
the steady-state has the following form :
J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA ;
J11 =
( + )
b k(1  k)
(1 + 1)  ;
J12 =
( + )
b k(1  k)
(2   1)  ;
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Figure 5: Income tax progressivity and stability: with transfer
J21 = 1( + );
J22 = 2( + ):
Figure 5 compares the stabilizing role between the labour and capital income tax and
is drawn under the same conditions as Figure 4 except for the assumption of the exis-
tence of a lump-sum transfer. In Figure 5-(a), variable capital income tax progressivity
is imposed with a at labour income tax. Unlike the case with wasteful government
spending, su¢ ciently regressive capital income tax (negative k) emerges as an e¤ective
stabilizing tax instrument with the lump-sum transfer. A negative determinant value is
observed in the negative area of k above the lower bound,
 1

. For the labour income
tax, progressive taxation can still work as a stabilizer as shown in Figure 5-(b). In ad-
dition, a su¢ ciently large negative l can also restore the determinacy of the stationary
equilibrium which is not observed in the case with wasteful government spending.
2.2.4 Toward the Determinacy : Intuition
In Benhabib-Farmer (1994), the mechanism that induces indeterminacy is explained
using the non-standard labour demand curve which is steeper than the labour supply
curve. To understand how indeterminacy arises, recall that the optimizing behaviour
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of the consumer leads to equation (15) which is expressed as
_

= (+ )  (1  m)r; (59)
where the co-state variable, ; is the shadow price of investment and (1   m)r is
the after-tax marginal return on capital. Now consider a situation where the con-
sumers at the stationary equilibrium somehow believe that  should be higher than
the current level. This belief works in a way that consumers reallocate their income
from consumption to investment. The reduction in consumption simultaneously moves
the labour supply curve downward. Since the slope of the labour demand curve is
greater than the supply curve under the su¢ ciently large externality, consumers work
less which decreases the aggregate level of employment. The increase in capital stock
and leisure decrease the after-tax marginal return on capital and  actually should
appreciate to equate both sides of the equation, (59), which validates the initial belief
of the consumers. However, the contraction in employment leads to decline in output
and a consequential decrease in the capital stock which moves the labour demand curve
downward, increasing employment. This process reverts the economy back to its initial
state as the fall in capital stock and increase in the hours worked increase the after-
tax marginal return on investment and as a result the shadow price of investment, ;
depreciates this time to satisfy the equation (59).
Since the unusual labour demand curve is the core factor causing indeterminacy, Guo
and Lansing (1998) seek to nd a stabilizing scal rule with an emphasis on whether it
can correct the labour demand curve, restoring the standard slope which is less steep
than the labour supply curve. In the rst-order condition for the optimal choice of
labour, (14), the labour demand and the labour supply schedule can be broken into
components as
CL|{z}
supply
= (1  m)w| {z }
after-tax wage
= (1  ) Y L(1 ) 1K| {z }
demand
:
Taking logarithms and letting wm represent the logarithm of the after-tax marginal
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wage, we obtain
c+ l = wm = ln(1  ) Y  + ((1  )  1)l + k;
where the slope of the labour demand curve is given by (1 ) 1 and the slope of the
labour supply curve is . Thus, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy,
(35) suggested by Guo and Lansing (1998) simply states that a  su¢ ciently large
enough to secure a labour demand curve that is less steep than the labour supply curve
can eliminate indeterminacy. When the labour income tax and the capital income tax
are levied separately, it can be noted from (41) that the slope of the labour demand curve
is given by (1 l) 1, so that only the progressive labour income tax can stabilize the
belief-driven uctuations through the labour demand curve channel. Capital income
tax cannot serve in this respect. Under the standard labour demand curve, when
the consumers decrease consumption and increase investment based on the belief in a
higher shadow price of the investment, , employment does not contract but expands,
leading to a further expansion of the capital accumulation. This increase in capital
moves the labour demand curve upward, decreasing the level of employment and since
the after-tax marginal return on capital falls in this condition, the appreciation of
the shadow price of capital should continue in order to satisfy the equation, (59). This
explosive over-accumulation process of capital cannot be sustained, eventually violating
the transversality condition, thus the consumers behaviour acting on this belief cannot
construct a proper equilibrium path.
As for how the regressive income taxation eliminates the indeterminacy, the process
where a contraction in employment driven by non-standard labour demand curve even-
tually leads to the contraction in capital stock should still be paid attention to. We can
conjecture two channels through which indeterminacy is corrected. Firstly, regressive
taxation can provide enough incentive for consumers to save to overturn the negative
e¤ect of decreasing employment on total output. Under regressive taxation, regardless
of the decrease in employment, the output still increases due to su¢ cient investment,
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enabling capital accumulation to keep expanding. However, when government spending
is wasteful, however large the incentive o¤ered, consumers cannot save enough to o¤-
set the e¤ect of decreasing employment because the tax payment just undermines the
consumersincome base to save. On the contrary, when the governments tax revenue
is repaid to the consumer as a lump-sum transfer, a reasonable level of regressive taxa-
tion can motivate consumers who now face a larger income-base to save enough. Since
this process acts on the consumers saving behaviour, when there are separate labour
and capital income taxes, only a regressive capital income taxation can work for this
purpose.
The second channel is involved with the labour demand curve. A regressive income
tax makes the slope of the labour demand curve even more steep than the labour supply
curve. Then the decrease in employment driven by the same amount of reduction in
consumption becomes smaller, alleviating the negative e¤ect on output. If the consumer
can secure enough income to save by the lump-sum transfer provision, this process can
provide a su¢ cient mechanism to exclude a contraction in capital stock which drives
the indeterminacy. However, under the wasteful government spending, a change in
the elasticity of labour supply with respect to consumption is not enough to create an
explosive capital accumulation process. As a result, when there is a lump-sum transfer,
a determinate equilibrium can be secured by either a progressive or regressive labour
income taxation as shown in Figure 5-(b). If the income tax is levied on total income,
these two channels work at the same time, reducing the degree of regressivity required
to eliminate the indeterminacy. In Figure 3-(b), a negative determinant is observed
from a much milder degree of regressivity than in Figure 5 where the labour and the
capital income tax are separately levied.
2.2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this section, we reviewed Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999) with a di¤erent
assumption about the use of the tax revenue. The well-established role of progressive
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taxation which corrects the steeper slope of the labour demand curve relative to the
labour supply curve can be conrmed here again irrespective of how the tax revenue
is used. What we nd is that the assumption that the tax revenue is not wasted as
government spending but is repaid to the consumers as a lump-sum transfer enables
a regressive income taxation to emerge as a stabilizer of the belief-driven uctuation
caused by the indeterminacy. The key di¤erence is on the income-base of the consumer.
With wasteful government spending, the consumer cannot save enough to overcome
the e¤ect of the non-standard labour demand curve, however large the regressivity is.
By contrast, as the governments lump-sum transfer provides a strong income-base,
consumers can invest a su¢ cient amount of capital in response to the regressive income
taxation, more than making up for the shortfall in the output due to a fall in the
employment.
In addition, we show that with lump-sum transfer it is clear that labour and capital
income taxes serve in a di¤erent way to dampen the belief-driven uctuations. For
the labour income tax, both a progressive and regressive taxation can be used as a
stabilizer. On the contrary, the capital income tax should be regressive in order for it
to be used to restore the determinacy.
2.3 Indeterminacy and Income Tax Progressivity in a Growth
Model with Productive Government Spending
2.3.1 Introduction
In the previous section, we investigated the stabilizing role of scal policy, the income
tax schedule in particular, in a growth model with an increasing-returns-to-scale tech-
nology sustained by a production externality. However, several works have shown that
macroeconomic-instability can be induced by some scal policy rules themselves. In
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997), it is shown that indeterminacy can arise even under
constant-returns-to-scale technology if government expenditure is xed and the income
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tax rate is determined by a balanced-budget rule. On the contrary, as Guo and Harri-
son (2004) point out, if the balanced-budget rule is implemented by a constant income
tax rate and endogenous public spending, the economy always exhibits saddle-path
stability.
Another example where the governments scal policy works as a source of indeter-
minacy is shown in Guo and Harrison (2008). They nd that when government spending
is productive or utility-generating, macroeconomic instability can be observed irrespec-
tive of whether the governments ability to change tax rates is restricted or not. In
Chen and Guo (2010), the issue of indeterminacy is also addressed in the growth model
with productive public expenditure rst suggested by Barro (1990) where government
spending is introduced as a complimentary input in the production technology. They
showed that the externality due to the existence of productive public expenditure could
act pretty much like the externality assumed in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) leading
to an indeterminate steady-state equilibrium. As for scal response, they found some
cases where the economy could be more susceptible to equilibrium indeterminacy when
the income tax schedule is more progressive which is in sharp contrast to Guo and
Lansing (1998).
In the previous section, we saw the case where labour and capital income taxes
could have di¤erent roles in stabilizing the belief-driven uctuations. This section aims
to check this possibility again in the growth model of Chen and Guo (2010). While
they consider a single income tax schedule for labour and capital income, this section
introduces a separate income tax schedule for each type of income. Under the wasteful
public expenditure case, studies of the separate taxation case like Guo (1999) and
Sims (2005) provide the same conclusion on the e¤ectiveness of progressive taxation
as stabilizer. By contrast, quantitative analysis of this study shows that labour and
capital income tax can be required to have the opposite direction of the progressivity
parameter in order to eliminate indeterminacy of macroeconomic dynamics. It turns
out that progressive labour income taxation can be e¤ective as an automatic stabilizer
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while capital tax should be regressive for the same purpose.
2.3.2 Model Description
The economy is assumed to be populated by a representative innitely-lived household.
Following Chen and Guo (2010), the life-time utility of the household to be maximized
is dened as
U =
Z 1
0
(lnCt  BLt)e tdt; B > 0;
where  is discount rate and Ct and Lt are consumption and hours worked respectively.
The household earns income by providing labour and capital to the market with factor
prices, wt and rt. Then the budget constraint for the household is given by
_Kt = (1   l)wtLt + (1   k)rtKt   Kt   Ct;
where Kt is the level of capital stock and  is depreciation rate.  l and  k are labour
and capital income tax rates respectively.
On the production side, a competitive rm produces a good with a technology
dened by
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t G

t ; 0 < ; ;  +  < 1;
where Gt is the public service provided by the government and nanced by labour and
capital income tax, say, Gt =  lwtLt +  krtKt. Under the assumption of a competitive
market where the level of Gt is taken as given, wt and rt are simply
wt = (1  )Yt
Lt
; rt = 
Yt
Kt
(60)
Following Guo (1999), the income tax rates,  l and  k are assumed to take the form
 l = 1   l(
wL
wtLt
)l ;  k = 1   k(
rK
rtKt
)k ; (61)
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where wL and rK are the steady-state labour and capital income level respectively,
which are taken as given by the household. In (61),  i and i is the level and slope
of each tax schedule respectively. When  is positive (negative), the tax rate increases
(decreases) with the income, which is called progressive (regressive) income taxation.
When  = 0, the tax rate is xed at all level of income, which is a at income taxation.
Notice that wtLt = (1   )Yt and rtKt = Yt. Then the income tax schedule in (61)
can be expressed as
 l = 1   l(
Y
Yt
)l ;  k = 1   k(
Y
Yt
)k ; (62)
where Y is the steady-state output level. From (62), the marginal tax rate of labour
(ml =
@ lwtLt
@wtLt
) and capital income (mk =
@krtKt
@rtKt
) can be dened as ml = 1   l(1 
l)(
Y
Yt
)l ; mk = 1    k(1   k)( YYt )k : It can be observed here that when l or k is
positive (negative), the average income tax rate is less (greater) than the marginal
income tax rate. For convenience, it is assumed that  l;  k 2 (0; 1) which implies
 l;  k 2 (0; 1). The marginal tax rate is also assumed to be less than one, which
provides the condition that l; k < 1.
2.3.3 Equilibrium
The current-value Hamiltonian for the problem can be constructed as
H(Ct; Lt; Kt;t) = lnCt BLt+tf l(wL)
l (wtLt)
1 l+ k(rK)
k (rtKt)
1 k Kt Ctg:
The rst-order conditions for this problem are
1
Ct
= t;
B = t l(1  l)(
wL
wtLt
)lwt;
 k(1  k)(
rK
rtKt
)krt    = t   _t;
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with transversality condition limt!1 e ttKt = 0: Combining these conditions with
(60) and (62), it can be obtained that
Lt =
1
B
t(1  ) l(1  l)Y lY 1 lt ; (63)
t
"
 k(1  k)Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
  
#
= t   _t: (64)
From these results, a system of two-dimensional di¤erential equations can be identied
as
_Ct
Ct
=  k(1  k)Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
  ( + ); (65)
_Kt
Kt
= f1   l(1  )   kg Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
  : (66)
Notice that
1   l(1  )   k = 1  [1   l(
Y
Yt
)l ](1  )  [1   k(
Y
Yt
)k ]
= (1  ) l(
Y
Yt
)l +  k(
Y
Yt
)k :
So (66) can be written
_Kt
Kt
= (1  ) lY l
Y
1 l
t
Kt
+  kY
k Y
1 k
t
Kt
  Ct
Kt
  : (67)
From (65) and (67), the ratio variables of steady-states capital ( K), consumption
( C) and output ( Y ) are dened by
Y
K
= x1 =
( + )
 k(1  k)
;
C
K
= x2 =
	
 k(1  k)
( + )  ;
Y
C
=
x1
x2
:
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where 	 = (1 ) l + k which is the average level of labour and capital income tax.
The steady-state hours worked (L) can be derived from (63) as
L =
1
B
(1  ) l(1  l)
x1
x2
:
Finally, the steady-state capital ( K) and consumption ( C) have values given by
K =

Ax 11 (1 	) L1 
1=(1  )
; C = x2 K
In logarithm terms, the system of (65) and (67) can be described as
_kt = (1  ) lY le(1 l)yt kt +  kY ke(1 k)yt kt   ect kt   ;
_ct =  k(1  k)Y ke(1 k)yt kt   ( + ):
Then the Jacobian matrix (J) of this dynamic system evaluated at the steady steady-
state has the following form :
J =
0B@ J11 J12
J21 J22
1CA ;
J11 =

(1  l)
 
  1

(1  ) lx1 +

(1  k)
 
  1

 kx1 + x2;
J12 =  (1  )(1  l)
 
(1  ) lx1  
(1  )(1  k)
 
 kx1   x2;
J21 =

(1  l)
 
  1

 k(1  k)x1;
J22 =  (1  )(1  k)
2
 
 kx1:
where
  = 1   1  (1  )(1  l) l   (1  k) k
1  (1  ) l    k
  (1  )(1  l):
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When  l =  k =  and l = k = , this corresponds to the case where the capital
and income taxes have the same schedule. Under this uniform income tax schedule, it
can easily be checked that all elements of Jacobian have the same values as those in
Chen and Guo (2010).
Since consumption (ct) is the only non-predetermined variable in the dynamic sys-
tem, the stability of the steady-state of this system can be checked with the eigenvalues
of Jacobian, J . For a saddle-path equilibrium to exist, two eigenvalues must have val-
ues of opposite sign, which corresponds to the condition that the determinant value
is negative (Saddle). When both eigenvalues have negative real parts so that the de-
terminant is positive and the trace is negative, the equilibrium steady-state is locally
indeterminate (Sink). In another case where the determinant and the trace are positive
due to positive real parts in both eigenvalues, the steady-state is unstable since any
small deviation from it leads to permanent divergence.
If we assume that  k =  l =  for convenience, the determinant of the Jacobian
above is
Det =

(1  l)
 
  1

(1  ) + 
2(1  k)
 

(k   l) (1  )x1 + 
x2

 (1  k)
 
x1;
where

 = (1  l) + (1  )(k   l)  (1  
1  (1  )(1  l) l   (1  k) k
1  (1  ) l    k
):
If k = l =  as in Chen and Guo (2010), the determinant has a very concise form as
Det =


 
 (1  )x1x2;
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where
  = 1   1  (1  ) 
1     (1  )(1  );

 = (1  )  (1   1  (1  ) 
1   ).
Given  > 0,  < 1, x1, x2, (1  ) > 0 with an assumption that 
 < 0, the necessary
and su¢ cient condition for determinacy, i:e:the negative determinant in Chen and Guo
(2010) is
  = 1   1  (1  ) 
1     (1  )(1  ) > 0. (70)
Since the slope of labour demand curve in this model is given by
(1  )(1  )
1   1 (1 ) 
1  
  1,
and that of labour supply curve is zero, condition, (70) simply requires that the labour
demand curve should be less steep than the labour supply curve. Therefore, as Chen
and Guo (2010) pointed out, the externality provided by the productive government
spending acts in the exactly same way as the externality in Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
does, in generating indeterminacy.
When there are separate income taxes for the capital and labour income, the con-
dition for determinacy is not as clear-cut as that of Chen and Guo (2010). However,
as long as the non-standard labour demand curve is a source of indeterminacy, we can
have a quick glance over the stabilizing role of the labour and capital income tax by
checking the way that the tax schedule of each tax works in the slope of labour demand
curve. In our model, the condition for the labour demand curve having a less steep
slope than the labour supply curve is given by
(1  )(1  l)
1   1 (1 )(1 l) l (1 k) k
1 (1 ) l  k
  1 < 0: (71)
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Unlike the case of the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) growth model that we have seen in
the previous section, the progressivity of capital income tax, k is involved in the slope
of labour demand curve. And k should be less progressive to satisfy condition, (71).
On the contrary, for the progressivity of the labour income tax, l, the condition, (71)
is more likely to be met when l is either su¢ ciently progressive or regressive.
2.3.4 Numerial Analysis
Having identied the condition for checking the stability of the dynamic system, this
section will explore how the stability is a¤ected by changes in some parameter values.
The basic parameter values used in the numerical analysis are  (capital share of na-
tional income): 0:3,  (discount rate): 0:05 and  (depreciation rate): 0:1. Most of
these parameters follow Chen and Guo (2010) or Benhabib and Farmer (1996). As for
the parameter , the degree of externality from the productive public expenditure, two
values, 0.2 (<) and 0.4 (>) are chosen. Variation in the value of  also reects the
results from previous empirical research that show a wide range of estimates of  as
noted in Chen and Guo (2010). For the level of income tax,  k and  l, the two values
of 0.6 and 0.8 are used. The smaller (larger) value is the case where the level of income
tax is larger (smaller) than the capital share of national income, .
Capital Income Tax Progressivity with linear Labour Income Tax Figure 6
shows the change in values of determinant and trace of J as the progressivity of capital
income tax schedule (k) changes. The labour income tax schedule is assumed to be
at here.
When  is low ( = 0:2), the externality from the productive public expenditure is
not large enough to create indeterminacy in equilibrium when both capital and labour
income tax have a at tax schedule as determinant value is negative in the origin in
Figure 6-(i) and (ii). This saddle-path stability can be supported with regressive and
modest progressivity. As the progressivity of capital income tax gets larger, the property
of the dynamics starts to change, rstly leading to unstable steady-state equilibrium
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(T > 0; D > 0) and then reaching indeterminate equilibrium (T < 0; D < 0) with
signicantly large progressivity. When the level of the income tax (1    l; 1    k) is
large, it can be observed in Figure 6-(ii) that the chance of indeterminacy emerging is
excluded with k less than zero.
When  is large ( = 0:4), a at income tax schedule for both capital and labour
income creates indeterminacy as a positive determinant and a negative trace show up
at the origin in Figure 6-(iii) and (iv). With a relatively low level of the income tax
( l =  k = 0:8), the recovery of a saddle-path equilibrium can be made by either a
mild regressive or an extremely progressive capital tax schedule (Figure 6-iii). When
the level of income tax is relatively high ( l =  k = 0:6), regressive capital taxation is
required for the determinate equilibrium (Figure 6-iv).
The e¤ectiveness of less progressive or regressive capital income tax as a sunspot
stabilizer is conrmed again in Figure 7 which shows how the dynamic property of
equilibrium steady-state changes as capital income tax progressivity and labour income
tax level vary. The labour income tax is still assumed to have a at schedule with
l = 0. Under a low , a less progressive capital income tax guarantees determinacy
in the system (Figure 7-i). With a high , the progressive capital income tax has a
very high chance to lead to indeterminacy as shown in area IV in Figure 7-(ii), while
in the case where the labour income tax level (1   l) is relatively low, a large degree
of progressivity can also be used to eliminate the indeterminacy like area III in Figure
7-(ii). In Figure 7-(ii), it can also be observed that a mildly regressive capital income
tax can stabilize belief-driven uctuations irrespective of the degree of labour income
tax level. Considering the fact that if ever there is a case for more progressive capital
income tax acting as a stabilizer the degree of progressivity required for it is too high to
be implemented in practice, a general conclusion can be made that the result of Chen
and Guo (2012) still holds in the case of capital income taxation.
Labour Income Tax Progressivity with linear Labour Income Tax Figure 8
displays the change in the values of determinant and trace of J as the progressivity of
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Figure 6: Capital Income Tax Progressivity and Macroeconomic Dynamics
Figure 7: Level of Labour Income Tax and Capital Income Tax Progressivity
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labour income tax schedule(l) changes. The capital income tax schedule is assumed
to be at in this section.
When  is low ( = 0:2), indeterminacy does not emerge under a at income tax
schedule as the determinant shows a negative value. However, contrary to the case
of the capital income tax, saddle-path stability is getting compromised as the labour
income tax becomes more regressive (Figure 8-i and ii). As the progressivity of the
labour income tax is getting smaller, the dynamic property of the equilibrium steady-
state rstly turns to "Source" (T > 0; D > 0) and then to "Sink" (T < 0; D < 0) with
signicantly large regressivity.
When  is large ( = 0:4), a at income tax schedule for both capital and labour
income makes indeterminacy show up as mentioned in the previous section. In both
cases with high and low capital income tax level, the recovery of a saddle-path equilib-
rium can be made only by adding progressivity to the labour income tax (Figure 8-iii
and iv). The level of the capital tax does not make a signicant di¤erence in results as
the degree of progressivity of regressivity required for determinacy does not vary much
with changes in the capital income tax level (Figure 9).
Combined Income Tax Progressivity Figure 10 displays the dynamic property of
steady-state equilibrium under various combination of labour and capital income tax
progressivity. It can be noted that an indeterminate equilibrium emerges when para-
meter values of k and l are in the area of IV in Figure 10-(i), (ii), V in Figure 10-(iii)
and VI in Figure 10-(iv). In practice, the income tax schedule is neither severely pro-
gressive nor regressive. For example, Chen and Guo (2012) estimated the progressivity
of the U.S income tax between 0.0634 and 0.1679. Considering this, the combination
of labour and capital income progressivity causing indeterminacy in the case of low 
(Figure 10-i and ii) can be regarded as implausible. When  is high, indeterminacy
emerges with mild levels of labour and capital income tax progressivity (Figure 10-iii
and iv).
When the level of the income tax is high (Figure 10-iv), determinacy can be restored
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Figure 8: Labour Income Tax Progressivity and Macroeconomic Dynamics
Figure 9: Level of Capital Income Tax and Labour Income Tax Progressivity
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Figure 10: Income Tax Progressivity and Macroeconomic Dynamics
by adding more progressivity to the labour income tax or reducing the progressivity of
the capital income tax or implementing both tax reforms at the same time. These three
options work well to eliminate indeterminacy under the low income tax rate. However,
in Figure 10-(iii), an additional option for achieving determinacy can be captured as
the saddle-path equilibrium can also be obtained by a signicantly large progressivity
of capital income tax. In fact, the lower level of income tax is, it turns out that the
e¤ectiveness of progressive capital tax as a stabilizer stands out more.
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2.3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter explores how the progressivity of the income tax schedule a¤ects the dy-
namic property of equilibrium in a growth model with productive government spending.
Chen and Guo (2010) already showed that less progressive taxation could work as a
sunspot stabilizer in this type of growth model and this chapter tried to see if that
result still holds when separate income tax schedules for labour and capital income are
introduced. It turned out that in the case of capital income tax, regressive or less pro-
gressive taxation could be more e¤ective in eliminating indeterminacy in line with Chen
and Guo (2010). However, as for the labour income tax, it was shown that an economy
with a less progressive tax schedule could be more susceptible to indeterminacy.
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3 Public Input and Public Consumption : The Op-
timality of Regressive Taxation
3.1 Introduction
It is a widely accepted notion that the provision of productive public services by govern-
ment such as infrastructure, education and public R&D spending can enhance the capa-
bility of an economy for steady growth. This possible contribution of public spending to
economic growth was highlighted in Barro (1990) where productive public expenditure
works as an engine for endogenously sustained long-term growth. By introducing gov-
ernment expenditure simply into a production function as an input factor, the economy
in Barro (1990) generates a balanced-growth path.
Meanwhile, since Barro-type growth model involves an externality associated with
public expenditure, much literature such as Turnovsky (1996a, 1996b, 2000) has studied
the optimal tax schedule which can correct a suboptimal outcome chosen by a private
agent into the socially most desirable one. The general conclusion of these works can
be summarized as the existence of a constant income tax rate that implements the
rst-best optimum in a competitive economy3.
The ndings mentioned above, though, require the strict assumption that the pro-
duction function shows constant-returns-to-scale technology with respect to private
capital and productive public expenditure. In other words, if the production function
has the Cobb-Douglas form Yt = AKt G

t where Yt; Kt and Gt are output, private capi-
tal and productive public expenditure respectively, a balanced-growth path exists only
when  +  = 1. However, none of empirical research that has tried to estimate the
coe¢ cient  has succeeded in showing that it is su¢ ciently large to enable constant-
returns-to-scale (de Haan and Romp, 2007). The generally accepted estimate for the
U.S production function from 1949 to 1985 is  = 0:35. Alongside this estimate, As-
chauer (1989) suggested that  has a value of 0.39. Even though it is larger than the
3Results from major literatures on this issue was surveyed in Irmen and Kuehnel (2009).
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productivity coe¢ cient of private capital and has been regarded as too high by the later
studies reported in de Haan and Romp (2007), it still implies  +  < 1.
This paper explores the case where the production function has decreasing-returns-to
scale with respect to private capital and productive government expenditure. The rst-
best optimum chosen by a central planner is characterized and then a tax policy that
replicates this optimum in a competitive economy is constructed. Since the economy
being considered here has a steady-state value rather than a balanced-growth path, the
rst-best optimum has a form of growth path converging to that steady-state from a
given initial state of economy. Therefore, the optimality of the income tax schedule will
be judged by how close the growth path it produces in the competitive economy is to
the entire rst-best growth path. The rst part of this section deals with a model with
inelastic labour. The major nding is that an intertemporally regressive income tax
schedule is required to generate a growth path close to the rst-best optimum. It also
turns out that this conclusion holds in general when the model includes endogenous
labour choice which we consider in the second part of this section.
3.2 A Growth Model with Inelastic Labour
3.2.1 Basic Model Description
The economy is assumed to consist of a large and xed number of identical consumers,
each with an innite life. A representative consumer chooses consumption to maximize
discounted lifetime utility given by
U =
Z 1
0
e t  u(Ct; Ht)dt;
where  is the discount rate, Ct is private consumption and Ht is the public con-
sumption service provided by the government. Leisure has no inuence on consumer
utility, so labour services are provided inelastically. For convenience, the utility func-
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tion, u(Ct; Ht) is assumed to have the logarithm form, lnCt + b lnHt, where b ( 0)
represents the relative weight of public consumption in utility.
The production function follows Barro (1990) with public expenditure serving as an
input to private production,
Yt = f(Kt; Gt) = AK

t G

t ; 0 < ; ;  +  < 1; (72)
where Kt is the capital stock and Gt is the level of productive government expenditure.
The model di¤ers from Barro by assuming that the production function has decreasing-
returns-to-scale with respect to private capital and public expenditure. Government
expenditure is set as a xed fraction of output
Ht = h  Yt; Gt = g  Yt; h + g < 1 (73)
For simplicity, public expenditure is not subject to any congestion, i.e. it is a pure
public good.
3.2.2 Centrally Planned Economy
Suppose that a benevolent social planner chooses the optimal resource allocation to
maximize utility given the production technology and the government expenditure ratio.
The global resource constraint for the planners problem is
_Kt = Yt   Ct  Ht  Gt = (1  h   g)Yt   Ct; (74)
where the dot represents the time derivative. For tractability, private capital is assumed
to depreciate fully.
Using the fact that the production function can be rewritten as Yt = A
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t
from (72) and (73), a well-dened two-dimensional dynamic system can be derived as
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follows:
_Kt
Kt
= (1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g K
+ 1
1 
t  
Ct
Kt
; (75)
_Ct
Ct
=

1   (1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g K
+ 1
1 
t + b

1  
Ct
Kt
  : (76)
with transversality condition, limt!1 e ttKt = 0:
The steady-state economy (K; C) satisfying the condition _Kt
Kt
=
_Ct
Ct
= 0 can be
found as
K =
24 (1  )
(1 + b)(1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g
35
1 
+ 1
(77)
C =
(1  )
(1 + b)
K: (78)
Proposition 1 In the centrally planned economy, there exists a saddle path converging
to the uniquely dened steady-state, (K; C).
Proof. The Jacobian matrix (J) of the dynamic system (75) and (76) is
J =
0B@ 1+b  (1 )(1+b)

1+b
h
 (1+b)(1 )
1 
i
b
1+b
1CA :
The determinant of J is always negative.
3.2.3 Decentralized Economy
Now assume the representative agent takes the level of public consumption (Ht) and
productive public expenditure (Gt) as given in her intertemporal decision. For simplic-
ity, the number of agents is normalized to one. The agent maximizes utility subject to
the budget constraint
_Kt = (1   y)Yt   (1 +  c)Ct   Tt;
where  y is the income tax rate and  c is the consumption tax rate. Tt is a lump-sum
tax or transfer to the consumer. To give variability to the income tax schedule, we
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adopt the tax schedule of Guo (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1998):
 y = 1   (
Y
Yt
); (79)
where the parameter  (> 0) is the level of the income tax and  represents the slope
of tax schedule. Y is the steady-state income level which is taken as given by the
consumer. A positive (negative)  means that tax rate rises (falls) as income level
increases, i.e. the income tax schedule is progressive (regressive). The government sets
public expenditure as a xed portion of output as in (73) and implements a balanced
budget so
Tt = (h + g    y)Yt    cCt:
The solution for the optimization problem generates the dynamic system for the
competitive economy
_Kt
Kt
= (1  h   g) Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
(80)
_Ct
Ct
=  (1  ) Y Y
1 
t
Kt
  ; (81)
The steady-state of this system (Kc ; C

c ) is dened by
Kc =
24 
 (1  )A 11  

1 
g
35
1 
+ 1
(82)
Cc =
(1  h   g)
 (1  ) K

c : (83)
Proposition 2 In a decentralized economy, there exists a saddle path converging to the
steady-state, (Kc ; C

c ) when
+ 1

<  < 1.
Proof. The Jacobian (JC) of (80) and (81) is
JC =
0B@ (1 h g)(1 ) (1 )  (1 h g) (1 )
[(1 )+ 1]
1  0
1CA :
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The determinant of JC is negative when + 1

<  < 1.
The steady-state (Kc ; C

c ) can have di¤erent dynamic properties according to the
value of . Too much regressivity ( < + 1

) makes the steady-state a source which
means there is no equilibrium path leading to it. If  is greater than one, the system
shows indeterminacy. The saddle-path equilibrium on which this paper focuses exists
only when + 1

<  < 1.
3.2.4 Optimal Taxation
Constant Income Tax Rate First, suppose that  = 0, i.e. the marginal tax rate is
constant. It is straightforward to nd the income tax rate that attains the steady-state
of the centrally planned economy by comparing (77) and (78) with (82) and (83). The
long-term optimal income tax rate is dened as
 y = 1    = 1 
(1 + b)(1  h   g)
1   : (84)
If there is no public consumption service, i.e. b = 0, the optimal income tax rate dened
in (84) holds throughout the entire growth path, since the dynamic system in (75) and
(76) is exactly the same as that in (80) and (81).
When b 6= 0, a di¤erence in transition dynamics can be observed. This is illustrated
in gure 11, which plots growth paths from a log-linear approximation for an example.4.
Figures 11-(a) and 11-(b) show that in the competitive economy with the constant
income tax rate;  y the consumer starts with more saving and less consumption than
the optimal level chosen by the central planner. The competitive economy therefore
reaches the steady-state faster. The reason for this can be found in gure 11-(c) which
shows the social marginal return to capital (r) and the net private after-tax return on
4The parameter values are A = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:3;  = 0:04; b = 1; g = 0:08 and h = 0:14.
These values generally follow Turnovsky (2000) but the value of b is chosen to highlight the di¤erence
more clearly. These parameter values will be used throughout this chapter when the growth paths are
displayed.
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Figure 11: Growth Paths of Centrally-planned and Competitive Economy
capital (rC) dened as
r =

1   (1  h   g)
Yt
Kt
+ b

1  
Ct
Kt
;
rC = (1   y) Yt
Kt
:
The di¤erence between these two rates of return results from the externality of the
public expenditure and public consumption services, which is ignored in the saving
decision of a consumer in the competitive economy. If these two rates are equal the
externality is internalized into the decision-making process of the consumer. As is clear
in gure 11-(c), a constant income tax fails to achieve the equality: rC is greater than
r at the initial point but the two rates become close as the economy converges to the
steady-state. The formal comparison of growth rates is given in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 With a constant income tax rate,  y, the negative eigenvalue of the
Jacobian matrix in the competitive economy is always less than that in the centrally
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planned economy.
Proof. With a constant income tax rate,  y, J
C becomes
JC =
0B@ 1+b  (1 )(1+b)
[+ 1]
1  0
1CA :
It is clear that D(J) = D(JC) and T (J) =  > 
1+b
= T (JC). Dene the characteristic
polynomials of p(J) and p(JC) as
p(J) = 2   T (J)+D(J); p(JC) = 2   T (JC) +D(JC):
Since D(J) = D(JC) < 0, each polynomial has a negative root which we denote by 1
and 1 respectively. Then
21   T (J)1 +D(J) > 2   T (J)+D(J) = 0:
Therefore, 1 < 1 or j1j > j1j.
The negative eigenvalue provides an approximation of the rate at which the deviation
from the steady-state is reduced, so is generally called "the speed of convergence to the
steady-state". Hence proposition 3 shows that the competitive economy with a constant
income tax rate implementing the rst-best steady-state in the long-term grows faster
than the centrally planned economy. The level of welfare for the constant tax rate is
therefore lower than the rst-best level.
Non-linear Income Taxation When  6= 0, the comparison of the steady-states of
the two economies provides the condition for the parameters of the income tax schedule,
 and , to implement the rst-best steady-state in a competitive economy:
 (1  ) = (1 + b)(1  h   g)
1   ; (85)
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Under a tax schedule with ( ; ) satisfying (85), the following proposition applies.
Proposition 4 (i) The level of the income tax schedule,  ; has no e¤ect on the tran-
sition dynamics.
(ii) The negative eigenvalue of Jacobian matrix in the competitive economy decreases
as  increases.
Proof. Evaluated at ( ; ); JC =
0B@ 1+b  (1 )(1+b)
[(1 )+ 1]
1  0
1CA :This proves (i). The
characteristic polynomial of JC is
2   
1 + b
+
2 [(1  ) +    1]
(1 + b)
= 0;
from which the two eigenvalues can be dened as
1; 2 =
1
2
0@ 
1 + b

s

1 + b
2
  4
2 [(1  ) +    1]
(1 + b)
1A ; 1 < 2: (86)
Since + 1

<  < 1, there are two real eigenvalues with di¤erent sign, i.e. 1 < 0
and 2 > 0. From (86), (ii) follows directly.
Proposition 4 implies that the speed of convergence to the same steady-state is faster
for higher . Since the competitive economy grows faster than the centrally-planned
economy when  = 0, it follows that the regressivity (negative ) moves the growth
path closer to the rst-best choice. This is illustrated in gure 12. If the negative
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in the centrally-planned and competitive economies
are the same, the approximations of the growth path around the steady-state for both
economies are also the same, so they have a common steady-state and an equal speed
of convergence. The existence of a regressive tax system that achieves this outcome is
proved in proposition 5.
Proposition 5 There exists a unique value  < 0 such that the negative eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix in the centrally-planned and competitive economies are equal.
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Figure 12: Growth Paths for Various Progressivity
Proof. Dene f() by
f() =  
s
2   4
2( +    1)
(1 + b)
  
1 + b
+
s

1 + b
2
  4
2 [(1  ) +    1]
(1 + b)
Since  +    1 < 0, it is easily checked that (i) f(0) > 0 and (ii) f is monotonically
increasing in . Now dene e < 0 such that (1 e)+ 1 = 0 and observe f(e) < 0.
The continuity of f() then establishes the existence of  < 0 such that f() = 0.
3.3 A Growth Model with Endogenous Labour
In this section, we will consider the case where labour supply is endogenously chosen.
The labour-leisure decision is now incorporated into the model by adding labour e¤ort
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(Lt) of an agent into the utility function5 and the production function as
u(Ct; Ht; Lt) = lnCt + b lnHt   1
1 + 
L1+t ;
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t G

t ; 0 < ;  <  + , (87)
where  is the inverse of the labour supply elasticity. The public consumption service
(Ht) and productive public capital (Gt) are provided by the rule dened in (73).
3.3.1 Centrally Planned Economy
While labour is introduced into utility and production sides, the global resource con-
straint faced by a benevolent social planner is the same as the one in (74). Combining
(73) and (87), the production function can be dened as
Yt = A
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t L
1 
1 
t :
Then the current-value Hamiltonian for the planners problem, H(Ct; Kt; Lt; t) can be
described as
H(Ct; Kt; Lt; t) = lnCt + b ln(hA
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t L
1 
1 
t )
  1
1 + 
L1+t + t

(1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t L
1 
1 
t   Ct

;
where t is the co-state variable. The rst-order conditions for this Hamiltonian are
1
Ct
= t; (88)
L+1t =
b(1  )
1   + t(1  h   g)
1  
1  Yt; (89)
b

1  
1
Kt
+ t

1   (1  h   g)
Yt
Kt
= t   _t; (90)
5This denition of utility function combines the framework of Barro (1990) and Benhabib and
Farmer (1994).
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lim
t!1
e ttKt = 0; (91)
which leads us to the dynamic system
_Kt
Kt
= (1  h   g) Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
; (92)
_Ct
Ct
=

1   (1  h   g)
Yt
Kt
+ b

1  
Ct
Kt
  : (93)
Since _Kt
Kt
=
_Ct
Ct
= 0 at the steady-state, the ratio of steady-state variables, Y ,K and
C can be found from the system above as
Y 
K
=
(1  )
(1 + b)(1  h   g) ;
C
K
=
(1  )
(1 + b)
;
Y 
C
=
1
1  h   g :
Combining these results and the rst-order conditions (88) and (89), the steady-state
value of all variables can be dened as
L =

(1 + b)(1  )
1  
 1
1+
(94)
K =
24 (1  )
(1 + b)(1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g
35
1 
+ 1
(L)
 1
+ 1 (95)
C =
(1  )
(1 + b)
K: (96)
Now to look into the stability of this steady-state economy, we can rewrite the dynamic
system of (92) and (93) using logarithmic variables, kt = lnKt; ct = lnCt and lt = lnLt
as
_kt = (1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g e
+ 1
1  kt+
1 
1  lt   ect kt
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_ct =

1   (1  h   g)A
1
1  

1 
g e
+ 1
1  kt+
1 
1  lt + b

1   e
ct kt   :
From (88) and (89), we notice that Lt can be expressed as a function of Ct and Kt in
an implicit form as
L+1t =
b(1  )
1   + (1  h   g)
1  
1  
A
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t L
1 
1 
t
Ct
:
Using this function, the partial derivatives of lt with respect to ct and kt evaluated at
the steady-state can be dened as
lc =
@lt
@ct
=   1  
(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  )
lk =
@lt
@kt
=

(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  ) :
Previous results can be used to derive the Jacobian Matrix, J = (Jij)22 evaluated at
the steady-state, which has the elements
J11 =
(1  )(1 + )
(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  )
J12 =  (1  )


(1  )(1 + )
(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  )

J21 =
 [(  (1 + b)(1  )) (1 + ) + (1  )]
(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  )
J22 =    [ b(1  )(1 + ) + (1  )]
(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  ) :
While each element seems to show much complexity, it can be checked that the value
of trace (T ) and determinant (D) for the Jacobian just collapse to
T = ;
D =
2( +    1)(1  )(1 + )
 [(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  )] :
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The discussion of the stability of this system will be put o¤until later when we compare
the results of centrally planned economy and a competitive economy.
3.3.2 Decentralized Economy
For the representative agent in a competitive market, the budget constraint is
_Kt = (1   k)rtKt + (1  w)wtLt   (1 +  c)Ct   Tt;
where rt is the rate of return on private capital and wt is the wage rate for a labour
unit.  k,w and  c are tax rates for capital gain, wage and consumption respectively
and Tt represents the lump-sum transfer to balance the government budget by the rule
dened by
Tt = (g + h)Yt    krKt   wwLt    cCt:
The current value Hamiltonian for the agent in a competitive market and its rst-order
conditions can be described as
H(Ct; Kt; t) = lnCt+b lnHt  1
1 + 
L1+t +t [(1   k)rtKt + (1  w)wtLt   (1 +  c)Ct   Tt]
1
Ct
= (1 +  c)t (97)
Lt = t(1  w)wt (98)
t(1   k)rt = t   _t; (99)
with the transversality condition, limt!1 e ttKt = 0:
From the assumption of the competitive market, rt and wt are determined in the
factor market according to their marginal production conditions:
rt = AK
 1
t L
1 
t G

t (100)
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wt = (1  )AKt L t Gt : (101)
Combining the fact that Yt = A
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t L
1 
1 
t with the rst-order conditions and
factor costs, a dynamic system can be dened as
_Kt
Kt
= (1  h   g) Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
(102)
_Ct
Ct
= (1   k) Yt
Kt
  ; (103)
and this system has a steady-state, (L; K; C):
LC =

(1  w)(1  )
(1 +  c)(1  h   g)
 1
1+
(104)
KC =
24 
(1   k)A
1
1  

1 
g
35
1 
+ 1
(L)
 1
+ 1 (105)
CC =
(1  h   g) 
(1   k) K
: (106)
From (97), (98) and (101), we can know that L+1t =
(1 w)(1 )
1 c A
1
1  

1 
g K

1 
t L
1 
1 
t C
 1
t
and consequently it can be obtained that ln(Lt) =
1 
(+1)(1 ) (1 ) ln

(1 w)(1 )
1+c
A
1
1  

1 
g

+

(+1)(1 ) (1 ) lnKt   1 (+1)(1 ) (1 ) lnCt. Then the dynamic system in (102) and
(103) can be rewritten with logarithm variables, kt = lnKt; ct = lnCt and lt = lnLt:
_kt = (1  h   g)e0+1kt+2ct   ect kt
_ct = (1   k)e0+1kt+2ct   ;
where
0 = lnA
1
1  

1 
g + 1 (+1)(1 ) (1 ) ln

(1 w)(1 )
1+c
A
1
1  

1 
g

;
1 =
(+ 1)(+1)+(1 )
(+1)(1 ) (1 ) ;
2 =   1 (+1)(1 ) (1 ) :
Notice that at the steady-state e0+1k
+2c = Y

K =

(1 k) and e
c k = C

K =
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(1 h g)
(1 k) : Using these result, the Jacobian matrix for the decentralized economy, J
C =
(JCij )22 can be dened as
J11 =
(1  h   g)
(1   k) (1 + 1);
J12 =
(1  h   g)
(1   k) (2   1);
J21 = 1;
J22 = 2:
Finally, the trace (T ) and determinant (D) of the Jacobian can be calculated as
T =

[(+ 1)(1  )  (1  )]

(1  h   g)(1 + )
(1   k)   (1  )

;
D =
2(1  h   g)
(1   k)
( +    1)(1 + )
[(+ 1)(1  )  (1  )]
The stability of this system will be discussed in the following section.
3.3.3 Optimal Taxation
(a) Constant Income Tax Rate
In the same manner in the case with inelastic labour, tax rates, ( w; 

k; 

c) to im-
plement the rst-best steady-state in a competitive economy can be dened from the
comparison of (94)-(96) with (104)-(106) by
1   w
1 +  c
= 1   k =
(1 + b)(1  h   g)
1   : (107)
However, in this case we cannot always guarantee that the economy will reach this
steady-state using these tax-rates since the stability of this steady-state could be dif-
ferent according to the parameter values. It is possible that even though a centrally-
planned economy and a competitive economy have the same steady-state, the stability
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of it could be di¤erent for the two cases. To check this fact, compare the values of trace
and determinant of a centrally-planned economy with those of a competitive economy
under the tax-rates satisfying (107):
Central Competitive
Trace  
1+b
[(1 )(1+) (1 )(1+b)]
[(1 )(1+) (1 )]
Determinant 
2(+ 1)(1 )(1+)
[(1 )(1+)(1+b) (1 )]
2(+ 1)(1 )(1+)
(1+b)[(1 )(1+) (1 )]
Since the dynamic system we are dealing with here has one predetermined variable,
the economy would show saddle-path stability and a unique growth path to a steady-
state if and only if the determinant of Jacobian has a negative value or the Jacobian has
two eigenvalues of opposite sign. If the determinant is positive and the trace is negative,
the steady-state is locally indeterminate and the nal case with positive determinant
and trace would mean that the steady-state is unstable, where any small deviation from
the steady-state would make the economy diverge from the steady-state. Here we have
three cases to look into.
Proposition 6 With the tax rate given by (107),
(i) The centrally planned economy and the competitive economy have a unique
saddle-path converging to the same-state if and only if (1  )(1 + )  (1  ) > 0 so
(1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  ) > 0.
(ii) A saddle-path can only be dened in the centrally-planned economy and the
steady-state in the competitive economy is unstable if and only if (1 )(1+) (1 ) <
0 but (1  )(1 + )(1 + b)  (1  ) > 0.
(iii) The steady-state is unstable both in the centrally-planned economy and the com-
petitive economy if and only if (1 )(1+)(1+b) (1 ) < 0 so (1 )(1+) (1 ) <
0.
In the rst case, both economies converge to the same steady-state, but the paths
are di¤erent if b 6= 0. As we have observed in the case of inelastic labour, the capital
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stock and the consumption level would show a faster growing path converging to the
steady-state than the centrally-planned economy since it can be shown that the speed
of convergence of capital and consumption would be always greater in the competitive
economy6. However, output may show a di¤erent growth pattern from capital and
consumption because of the endogenous labour choice. As shown in Figure 13, under
the constant income tax rate given by (107), the competitive agent chooses a higher
level of labour than the rst-best choice of the central planner at the initial point
and decreases labour supply at a faster speed. In the competitive economy, output is
decreasing while it grows in the centrally-planned economy.
In the second case, the planned equilibrium and the competitive equilibrium also
show the same steady-state. However, this case means that the constant income tax rate
dened in (107) cannot implement the rst-best steady-state in a competitive economy
unless the economy is put on that steady-state from the start. In the nal case, it is
impossible in both economies to construct a growth path converging to the common
steady-state when the economy starts from a state away from the steady-state.
(b) Non-linear Income Taxation : Uniform Income Tax
In this section, we consider the income tax schedule given by (79). For simplicity,
it is assumed that income tax rate is set equal for capital and labour income, i.e.
w =  k =  y. The current value Hamiltonian for the agent in a competitive market
and its rst order conditions are given by
H(Ct; Lt; Kt; t) = lnCt + b lnHt   1
1 + 
Lt + t
h
 Y Y 1 t   (1 +  c)Ct   Tt
i
;
6From the table, we can check that T (J) > T (JCP ) and D(J) > D(JCP ). So the characteristic
polynomials of p(J) and p(JCP ) can be dened as
p(J) = 2   T (J)+D(J); p(JCP ) = 2   T (JCP ) +D(JCP ):
Since D(J); D(JCP ) < 0, two polynomials have an negative root denoted by 1 and 1 respectively.
Then
21   T (J)1 +D(J) > 21   T (JCP )1 +D(JCP ) = 0;
since T (J) > T (JCP ); D(J) > D(JCP ) and 1 is negative. Therefore, we can conclude that 1 < 1
or j1j > j1j.
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Figure 13: Growth Paths of Centrally-planned and Competitive Economy
1
Ct
= (1 +  c)t; (108)
L+1t = t
h
 (1  )(1  ) Y Y 1 t
i
; (109)
 (1  ) Y Y 1 t =  
_t
t
; (110)
with the transversality condition, limt!1 e ttKt = 0:
These results lead us to the dynamic system,
_Kt
Kt
= (1  h   g) Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
; (111)
_Ct
Ct
=  (1  ) Y Y
1 
t
Kt
  ; (112)
and the steady-state values,
L =

 (1  )(1  )
(1 +  c)(1  h   g)
 1
+1
;
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K =
24 
 (1  )A 11  

1 
g
35
1 
+ 1
(L)
1 
+ 1 ;
C =
(1  h   g)
 (1  ) K
:
By comparing these steady-states with those of a central planner, the tax schedule to
implement the rst-best steady-state in a competitive economy can be dened as
 (1  ) = (1 + b)(1  h   g)
1   ;  c = 0: (113)
To check the stability of the system, the system of (111) and (112) should be rewrit-
ten with logarithmic terms, kt = lnKt; ct = lnCt and lt = lnLt as
_kt = (1  h   g)eyt kt   ect kt (114)
_ct =  (1  ) Y e(1 )yt kt   : (115)
From (108) and (109), we obtain the fact that lt = 1(1+) log
 (1 )(1 ) Y 
(1+c)
+ 1 
1+
yt  11+ct
and as a result, it holds that
@yt
@kt
= 1 =
(+ 1)
(1  )(1 + )  (1  )(1  ) ;
@yt
@ct
= 2 =   1  
(1  )(1 + )  (1  )(1  ) :
Combining these results with the fact that Y

K =

 (1 ) and
C
K =
(1 h g)
 (1 ) , the
elements of the Jacobian of the system (114) and (115) evaluated at the steady-state,
JCP = (JCPij )22 can nally be given as
JCP11 =
(1  h   g)
 (1  ) 1;
JCP12 =
(1  h   g)
 (1  ) (2   1) ;
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JCP21 =  [(1  )1   1] ;
JCP22 = (1  )2;
with the trace (T ) and determinant (D):
T =

[(+ 1)(1  )  (1  )(1  )]

(1  h   g)(1 + )
 (1  )   (1  )(1  )

;
D =
2(1  h   g)
 (1  )

((1  ) +    1) (1 + )  (1  )
(+ 1)(1  )  (1  )(1  )

:
Under the tax schedule dened by (113), the values of T and D would be as follows:
Central Competitive
Trace  
1+b
[(1 )(1+) (1 )(1 )(1+b)]
[(1 )(1+) (1 )(1 )]
Determinant 
2(+ 1)(1 )(1+)
[(1 )(1+)(1+b) (1 )]
2(1 )[((1 )+ 1)(1+) (1 )]
(1+b)[(1 )(1+) (1 )(1 )]
While it can be noticed that the degree of progressivity or regressivity, ; is now
involved with the value of trace and determinant of Jacobian of a competitive economy,
it is not straightforward to see the e¤ect  has on those values since it inuences both
the denominator and the numerator. To make the points clear, gure 14 displays an
example of the three cases in proposition 6. With other parameter values except  set
equal to those in Turvosky (2000)7, three values of , 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6 now create the
situations representing case 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Figure 14-(a) shows a case where the competitive and the centrally-planned equi-
librium have saddle-path stability. When  = 0, the determinant and the trace in
the competitive equilibrium are smaller than those in the centrally-planned economy,
so that the absolute value of the negative eigenvalue of the competitive Jacobian is
greater than that of the centrally-planned Jacobian as we have shown earlier. The
negative eigenvalue of Jacobian approximates the pattern of growth in capital and con-
7Parameter values are A = 1;  = 0:3;  = 0:04;  = 0:3; b = 1:0; g = 0:08 and h = 0:14. These
parameter values will be used throughout this chapter when we display the determinant and the trace.
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Figure 14: Trace and Determinant under the Various Progressivity
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sumption by giving a rate of the convergence speed at which the deviation from the
steady-state is reduced. In the case with xed labour supply, the trajectory of capital
governs the evolution of all variables including output and consumption since capital
is the only production input. However, when labour is elastic, the negative eigenvalue
alone is not enough to decribe the evolution of other variables except capital since the
level of capital and consumption endogenously denes the labour choice through equa-
tion, (109). For this reason, in addition to the negative eigenvalue, we should consider
the stabilizing constant which denes the choice rule of initial consumption with respect
to initial capital to assure that the economy is put on the determinate saddle-growth
path8. When the income tax is at ( = 0), it turns out that the stabilizing constant
in the competitive economy is larger than the one in the centrally-planned economy.
Since the stabilizing constant represents the ratio of initial distance to steady-state of
consumption over the distance of initial capital from the steady-state, the competitive
economy starts from a lower level consumption and converges to the steady-state faster
than the centrally-planned economy as we can observe in Figure 13. In this sense, the
di¤erence in the negative eigenvalue and the stabilizing constant between the compet-
itive and the centrally-planned economy can capture how close to the social optimum
the growth path in the competitive economy is.
In Figure 14-(a), saddle-path stability is maintained for positive . It can be noted
that the determinant and the trace are increasing in  for  > 0, but they are smaller
than those of the centrally-planned equilibrium for all 0 <  < 1. Thus, the absolute
value of the negative eigenvalue of Jacobian is decreasing in  for  > 0. For the
stabilizing constant, it starts from a larger value in the competitive economy than the
planned economy when  = 0 and it also decreases in  for  > 0. Thus, the competitive
economy with a larger  shows a closer growth pattern to the rst-best growth. For
8In the rst-order log-linear approximation, the initial consumption, c0 is chosen by the rule:
ln co   ln css = stabilizing constant  (ln k0   ln kss);
where css and kss are the steady-state values of the consumption and the capital respectively and k0
is the ininital level of capital. For more details, see Novales et al (2008).
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negative , the dynamic property of the steady-state changes at  = (+ 1)(1+)
+1
and
  (1 )(1+) (1 )
(1 ) . The determinacy is observed in   (1 )(1+) (1 )(1 ) <  < 0 or  <
(+ 1)(1+)
+1
. When   (1 )(1+) (1 )
(1 ) <  < 0, the saddle-path in the competitive
equilibrium is growing even faster than the competitive economy under a constant
income tax rate, so that the growth path is getting more distant from the rst-best
optimum. On the contrary, when  is smaller than (+ 1)(1+)
+1
, the determinant and
the trace are larger than those of the centrally-planned economy and they are decreasing
as the regressivity gets larger. The competitive economy under the su¢ ciently negative
 shows a slower growth pattern than the planned economy and the absolute value of
the negative eigenvalue is getting larger as  decreases. When  < (+ 1)(1+)
+1
, the
stabilizing constant also starts from a smaller value than the rst-best optimum and
increases as the regressivity gets larger. Thus, the growth path is getting closer to the
rst-best optimum as  decreases.
Both progressive and regressive tax schedules are welfare-improving in the sense that
they can replicate the rst-best steady-state with a growth path closer to the optimal
one than a constant tax schedule. However, the e¤ectiveness of each tax schedule can be
very di¤erent as we can see in Figure 15. In Figure 15-(a), we display the change in the
growth path as the progressivity () increases. It can be observed that the growth path
with a higher progressivity is closer to the centrally-planned growth path, but even
with very high progressivity, the competitive equilibrium fails to replicate the rst-
best optimum completely. On the contrary, Figure 15-(b) shows that the competitive
equilibrium creates a faster growing economy as the regressivity is getting larger. Since
the centrally-planned growth path is observed in the middle of the competitive growth
path with  =  1:0 and  2:0, we can conjecture that there exist  2 ( 2:0; 1:0) that
enables the rst-best growth path to be implemented in the decentralized economy. In
fact, under the parameter values used in Figure 15 it can be checked that the negative
eigenvalue of the Jacobian in the competitive equilibrium is monotonically decreasing as
 decreases and it is equal to the negative eigenvalue of the centrally-planned economy
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(-0.0262) when    1:32. And at this value of , the stabilizing constant in the
competitive economy also coincides with the one in the centrally-planned economy
(0.7739). For positive , as  goes to 1, the negative eigenvalue and the stabilizing
constant converge to -0.0483 and 0.8406 respectively. To sum up, regressive taxation is
superior to progressive taxation in creating a more desirable growth path.
In Figure 14-(b), the steady-state in the competitive equilibrium with a constant
income tax schedule ( = 0) becomes a source since both the determinant and the
trace are positive, while the centrally-planned economy shows saddle-path stability.
In this case, the negative determinant which is the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for determinacy can be restored with either a progressive or a regressive income tax
schedule, thus the socially-desirable steady-state can be reached through a uniquely
dened growth path in the decentralized economy. However, as we have seen in the
rst case, regressive taxation e¤ectively replicates the rst-best growth path, while
progressive taxation shows limited power.
Finally, Figure 14-(c) displays the macroeconomic dynamics when the production
externality,  is high enough to make the steady-state in both the centrally-planned
and the competitive economy become a source. Even when the central-planner cannot
dene an equilibrium path converging to the steady-state, a converging saddle-path
can be implemented in the decentralized economy if the income tax schedule is either
su¢ ciently progressive or regressive.
3.3.4 Non-linear Income Taxation : Separate Taxation on Capital and
Labour Income
In this section, we explore the case where the tax schedules of capital and labour income
can be di¤erent. Following Guo (1999), non-linear tax schedules for capital and labour
income are dened by
 k = 1   k(
rtKt
rtKt
)k ;  l = 1   k(
wtLt
wtLt
)l ;
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Figure 15: Growth Path under the Various Progressivity
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where the parameters  k and  l are the level of the capital and the labour income
tax and k and l represent the slopes of the tax schedules. rtKt and wtLt are the
steady-state level of the capital and the labour income respectively which is taken as
given by the consumer. With these tax schedules, the current-value Hamiltonian can
be constructed as
H(Ct; Lt; Kt; t) = lnCt + b lnHt   1
1 + 
Lt + t[ k(rtKt)
k(rtKt)
1 k
+ l(wtLt)
l(wtLt)
1 l + (1 +  c)Ct   Tt]:
Then rst-order conditions are
1
Ct
= (1 +  c)t (116)
Lt = t

 l(1  2)wt(
wtLt
wtLt
)l

(117)
 k(1  k)rt(
rtKt
rtKt
)k =  
_t
t
(118)
lim
t!1
tKt = 0:
Now notice that in a competitive market, it holds that wt = (1   ) YtLt and rt =  YtKt ,
so wtLt
wtLt
= rtKt
rtKt
= Y t
Yt
. Put these results into (117) and (118) and we can obtain
L+1t = t
h
 l(1  l)(1  ) Y lY 1 lt
i
(119)
 k(1  k) Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
=  
_t
t
:
The dynamic system then can be dened as
_Kt
Kt
= (1  h   g) Yt
Kt
  Ct
Kt
(120)
_Ct
Ct
=  k(1  k) Y k
Y
1 k
t
Kt
  : (121)
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This system provides us the steady-state values
L =

 l(1  l)(1  )
(1 +  c)(1  h   g)
 1
+1
;
K =
24 
 k(1  k)A
1
1  

1 
g
35
1 
+ 1
(L)
1 
+ 1 ;
C =
(1  h   g)
 k(1  k)
K:
By comparing these steady-states with those of a central planner, the tax schedule to
implement the rst-best steady-state in a competitive economy can be dened as
 l (1  l ) =  k(1  k) =
(1 + b)(1  h   g)
1   ; (122)
when we set  c = 0 for convenience. The expression of the system of (120) and (121)
in terms of logarithmic variables, kt = lnKt; ct = lnCt and lt = lnLt is
_kt = (1  h   g)eyt kt   ect kt (123)
_ct =  k(1  k) Y ke(1 k)yt kt   : (124)
Notice that (116) and (119) are implying that lt = 1(1+) log
 l(1 l)(1 ) Y l
(1+c)
+ 1 l
1+
yt  
1
1+
ct and as a result
@yt
@kt
= 1 =
(+ 1)
(1  )(1 + )  (1  )(1  l)
;
@yt
@ct
= 2 =   1  
(1  )(1 + )  (1  )(1  l)
:
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Using these results, the elements of Jacobian of the system (123) and (124), JCP =
(JCPij )22 can nally dened as
JCP11 =
(1  h   g)
 k(1  k)
1;
JCP12 =
(1  h   g)
 k(1  k)
(2   1) ;
JCP21 =  [(1  k)1   1] ;
JCP22 = (1  k)2;
with the trace (T ) and determinant (D):
T =

[(+ 1)(1  )  (1  )(1  l)]

(1  h   g)(1 + )
 k(1  k)
  (1  k)(1  )

;
D =
2(1  h   g)
 k(1  k)

((1  k) +    1) (1 + )  l(1  )
(+ 1)(1  )  (1  )(1  l)

:
Under the tax schedules dened by (122), the values of T and D would be as follows:
Central Competitive
Trace  
1+b
[(1 )(1+) (1 k)(1 )(1+b)]
[(1 )(1+) (1 l)(1 )]
Determinant 
2(+ 1)(1 )(1+)
[(1 )(1+)(1+b) (1 )]
2(1 )[((1 k)+ 1)(1+) l(1 )]
(1+b)[(1 )(1+) (1 )(1 l)]
From the table, we can notice that k and l change the value of the trace and the
determinant in di¤erent ways since k does not appear in the denominator of the values
while l is involved with both denominator and numerator. In the same manner with
the uniform income tax case, in Figure 16 we display some examples representing each
case in proposition 6. The rst column of Figure 16 shows the dynamic property of
each case when the capital income tax is assumed to be at and only the progressivity
of the labour income tax can change. In the second column, the labour income tax is
at and the capital income tax can vary in the progressivity.
The role of progressivity of the labour income tax is similar to that of the tax levied
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Figure 16: Trace and Determinant for Separate Income Tax
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on the total income. When both the centrally-planned economy and the competitive
economy have saddle-path stability (Case1), the competitive economy with a at labour
income tax shows a larger absolute value of the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian than
the centrally-planned economy and for l > 0 the negative eigenvalue increases in l,
getting closer to the one in the planned economy. In Figure 17-(a) where the growth
paths for progressive labour income tax are displayed, it is observed that the growth
path for the capital with a larger l is closer to the planners optimal growth path.
However, for the growth path of consumption a larger progressivity does not create
a closer path to the rst-best optimum as the initial consumption level with a larger
progressivity (l = 0:99) turns out to be farther apart from the rst-best level of initial
consumption. This occurs because the stabilizing constant increases as the progressivity
is getting larger when l is positive. When the labour income tax is regressive, the
saddle-path stability is attained for l <
(+ 1)(1+)
1  and   (1 )(1+) (1 )1  < l <
0. Figure 17-(b) suggests that there also exists l 2 ( 2:0; 1:0) that provides the
same negative eigenvalue to the centrally-planned economy as the planned growth path
is placed between the growth paths with l =  1:0 and  2:0. When l   1:31,
the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian in both competitive and planned economy is
 0:0262. Although l succeeds in creating the rst-best growth path of the capital
in the decentralized economy, it does not automatically guarantee the implementation
of the rst-best growth path of consumption since the stabilizing constant is still far
o¤ from the one in the centrally-planned economy. At l =  1:31, the stabilizing
constant in the competitive economy is 0:9435 and it is much smaller in the centrally-
planned economy (0:7739). Therefore, when only labour income tax is allowed to vary
in progressivity, neither progressive nor regressive taxation can be straightforwardly
welfare-improving compared to a constant labour income tax. When the centrally-
planned economy has a unique saddle-path converging to the steady-state, but the
steady-state in the competitive economy with a constant tax rate becomes a source
(Case 2), both a progressive or a regressive labour income tax schedule can restore
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saddle-path stability in the decentralized economy. But the superiority of regressive
taxation over progressive taxation in implementing the rst-best optimum cannot be
asserted in a way that we do in the previous section. When both economies show the
source property (Case 3), both a progressive or a regressive labour income tax can
create a saddle-path converging to the steady-state of the central planner.
For the capital income tax, the way the trace and the determinant change according
to progressivity is quite di¤erent. When the production externality is small (Figure
16-b1), the trace is monotonically increasing in k while the determinant moves in the
opposite direction. Since the pace with which the trace is increasing is far greater
than that of the decreasing determinant, the economy with more pregressive capital
income tax shows a slower growth pattern in the capital than the economy with the
constant income tax as we can see in Figure 18-(a). The growth path in capital created
by larger k is closer to the rst-best optimum. However, for consumption, a more
progressive capital income tax fails to create a more desirable growth path as the
distance in stabilizing constant between the competitive economy and the centrally-
planned economy is getting larger as k increases. The role of regressive taxation in
securing a determinate equilibrium revives as  gets larger. In Figure 16-(b2) and 16-
(b3), the unstable equilibrium prevails for the positive k and saddle-path stability can
be guaranteed only when k is su¢ ciently large. It can be checked that the negative
eigenvalue of the Jacobian is monotonically decreasing in k for k <
+ 1

, so that
the speed of the convergence is greater for the smaller k. Thus, the growth path
in capital approaches the rst-best one as the regressivity in the capital income tax
increases. However, the centrally-planned consumption path cannot be implemented
with a regressive capital income tax neither, since the stabilizing constant is smaller for a
larger capital income tax regressivity. In Figure 18-(b), when k =  1:0, the stabilizing
constant is 0.5907 while it is 0.5776 when k =  2:0. Compared to the stabilizing
constant in the centrally-planned economy, 0.7739, the initial level of consumption in the
competitive economy with a larger regressivity is farther from the rst-best choice than
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Figure 17: Labour Income Tax Progressivity and Growth Path
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the one in a smaller regressivity. To sum up, when the change in progressivity is allowed
only in the capital income tax, the rst-best growth path cannot be decentralized in
the competitive economy.
3.4 Conclusion
This section studied the optimal income tax structure in a Barro-type growth model
with decreasing-returns-to-scale technology and a public consumption good. When the
externality from productive public spending is large enough to create a balanced-growth
path, the central planner can internalize the externality in a decentralized economy with
a combination of constant income tax and lump-sum tax. If there is no public consump-
tion, a constant income tax is still e¤ective in decreasing-returns-to-scale technology,
but we nd that the inclusion of the public consumption can make a di¤erence. In
our model, a constant income tax rate that implements the rst-best optimum steady-
state in the long-run does not replicate the rst-best growth path converging to the
steady-state irrespective of whether the labour supply is xed or endogenously chosen.
When the labour supply is xed, the decentralized economy grows too quickly and a
progressive tax worsens the excessively rapid growth. In contrast, intertemporally re-
gressive income tax moves the decentralized growth path closer to the optimal path,
and a unique level of regressivity exists for which the rst-best optimum is decentralized
to a rst-order approximation.
When the labour supply is endogenous, both progressive and regressive income
taxation can implement a welfare-improving growth path compared to the competitive
equilibrium with the constant income tax rate. However, regressive taxation turns out
to be more e¤ective in replicating the central planners equilibrium since it can create
approximately the same growth-path to the rst-best while the progressive cannot.
When the production externality is large, the competitive economy cannot dene any
equilibrium path to the rst-best steady-state with a constant income tax. A regressive
tax schedule can restore saddle-stability in the competitive economy and the higher is
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Figure 18: Capital Income Tax Progressivity and Growth Path
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the regressivity, the closer the saddle-growth path to the rst-best.
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4 Quasi-hyperbolic Preferences and Optimal Taxa-
tion in a Growth Model with Productive Public
Spending
4.1 Introduction
Many of the standard economic models that include an intertemporal utility maximiza-
tion problem normally assume that consumers have exponential discount functions. A
consumer with this form of discount function assigns a weight to the utility of each
period in a manner that decreases exponentially so that the relative importance of to-
days utility with respect to tomorrows is evaluated equally to that of utility of period
t with respect to utility of the next period t + 1. This assumption not only gives a
model more tractability and implies a crucial condition for the existence of equilibrium,
but also gives the very convenient property that once a life-time consumption path is
chosen by a consumer, the same consumption path is chosen regardless of the timing of
decision making. What consumers have to do is to solve the optimization problem at
the beginning and just follow the consumption path onwards. Since they do not need
to think or worry about revision of their rst choice, the assumption of an exponential
discount function precludes a situation where inconsistency issues arise.
The problem is, however, that the rationale for this assumption has not been prop-
erly veried. Rather, the argument against the exponential discount function has been
gaining more ground since the results of experimental research like Ainslie (1992) sug-
gest that the actual discount function can be closer to a hyperbola than exponential.
A consumer having hyperbolic preferences now applies a higher discount rate between
today and tomorrow than any other far o¤ adjacent periods, t and t + 1; and conse-
quently shows a tendency to postpone an action leading to immediate disutility to a
later date.
Strotz (1955) studied a dynamic utility maximization model with a general form of
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discount function embracing the exponential function as a special case. He showed that
except for a very special case where the discount function happens to be exponential,
the optimal plan of the present date always turns out to be not optimal for a consumer
in later dates as they need to revise their plan in every period (or at every moment in
continuous time). To address this dynamic inconsistency, Strotz suggested two alter-
natives. The rst is to contrive a commitment scheme which prevents all future selves
from deviating from the initial plan by imposing a penalty for disobedience. While this
approach can be widely observed in practice such as joining a pension scheme which
has penalty terms for early withdrawal, the e¢ cacy of this strategy is very di¢ cult to
be guaranteed especially under circumstances where the nancial market can provide
various borrowing options for which the commitment scheme can be used as collateral
(Barro, 1999). An individual may hesitate to set up a strict precommitment device
simply because of future risk and uncertainty (Strotz, 1955). The other alternative is
to assume more sophistication in the decision-making process. The agent gives up any
plan that will be rejected by his future selves and nds the plan which his selves will
follow by embracing the untrustworthiness of the future selves. As we will see from the
next sections, the solution from this strategy of consistent planning can be found by
applying backward-induction. Since this sophisticated reasoning is assumed for all the
selves the initial plan by the current agent is realized all through his life.
Assuming agents take a consistent planning strategy, Phelps and Pollak (1968) rstly
studied the welfare implications of the competitive equilibrium under quasi-hyperbolic
preferences and found out that the marginal upward deviation from the equilibrium
saving rate can make the economy better o¤. While they did not explore the specic
optimal saving rate, the result shows that the equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal at
least and the economy is undersaving at equilibrium. This non-Pareto optimality of
competitive equilibrium under quasi-hyperbolic preferences was studied further by Li-
abson (1996) which dened specic saving rates that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium
saving rate and suggested that public policy commands those saving rates in the com-
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petitive economy. Krusell et al (2002) introduced quasi-hyperbolic consumers into a
standard Ramsey growth model and found out that quasi-hyperbolic preferences break
the fundamental welfare theorem that states the Pareto-optimality of a competitive
equilibrium. Furthermore, they showed an interesting result that competitive equilib-
rium outperforms a planned economy so that any policy intervention of the government
commanding the planners equilibrium is not desirable.
Taking one step further from Krusell et al (2002), this chapter embraces quasi-
hyperbolic preferences into a growth model with productive public spending. In Krusell
et al (2002), the role of tax policy is only restricted to correcting the agents saving
behaviour. In this chapter, government spending nanced by taxes provides a com-
plementary input factor to the production function of the private sector as in Barro
(1990). The focus should be di¤erent since the competitive equilibrium cannot be
Pareto-optimal in its nature when there is externality that cannot be fully internalized
by a competitive agent. Thus, our main interest in this chapter is in the di¤erence in
the optimal tax policy resulting from quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
To address this issue, we take two di¤erent approaches to dening the optimal tax
policy. First, we consider a ctitious planning problem where the central planner shares
the quasi-hyperbolic preferences with a representative agent and we investigate tax
policy that obtains the planners equilibrium in a decentralized economy. When a lump-
sum tax is available the tax policy that can implement the rst-best in a decentralized
economy has a zero capital income tax rate, which is not the case in a standard Ramsey
growth model. We also observe that quasi-hyperbolic preferences result in a failure of
the rst-best choice to attain Pareto-e¢ ciency. A better resource allocation than the
rst-best choice can be accomplished with negative capital income tax rates or a subsidy
to capital income. Second, we explore second-best taxation from the Ramsey scal
policy approach with three di¤erent degrees of commitment, when a lump-sum tax is
not available. Under full commitment, when labour supply is inelastic, it is optimal
for the government to levy a negative capital tax rate, while a positive capital tax rate
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which should be larger for more impatient consumers is the second-best choice when
labour supply is endogenous. In the complete absence of commitment, we observe a
continuum of optimal tax policies in the xed labour case and a bad equilibrium where
the government conscates all of capital income so that no agent saves in the elastic
labour case. Finally, under one-period partial commitment, we nd that a zero capital
income tax rate is restored in the inelastic labour case and a positive capital tax rate,
which is higher than the full commitment case, should be levied in the elastic labour
case.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the two
basic growth models with agents that have the quasi-hyperbolic preferences of Laibson
(1996) and Krusell et al (2002). We intend this part to be an introduction of our
backward induction approach that we take to obtain solutions throughout this chapter.
In section 3 we deal with a Barro-type growth model with quasi-hyperbolic preferences
and study the tax policy implications of quasi-hyperbolic preferences. The nal section
nishes the chapter with conclusion.
4.2 Quasi-hyperbolic Preferences and Saving Behaviour: Re-
view
4.2.1 A General Overview of Laibson(1996) Model
Quasi-hyperbolic preferences and dynamic inconsistency The discount func-
tions suggested in behavioural experiments are close to a form of hyperbola generalized
by the function f(t) = (1 + t) = at time t with ;  > 0 (Lowenstein and Pr-
elec,1992). In this hyperbolic discount function, the discount rate declines as time goes
further away from the present. The most intriguing property of this function is that
the instantaneous discount rate at time t is dened by =(1 +), falling as t moves for-
ward, which is in contrast with the exponential discount function which has a constant
instantaneous discount rate. Barro (1999) used a more general discount function in
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continuous time which was given by exp[   t (t)] at time t where (t) is a function
satisfying 0(t)  0; 00(t)  0 and 0(t) ! 0 as t ! 1. The instantaneous discount
rate for this function is +0(t) which is not constant and higher in the near term than
in the distant future.
Laibson (1996) adopted a special case of the discount function named as "quasi-
hyperbolic or quasi-geometric" which has a value of 1 for t = 0 and t for t  1 in
discrete time. This function preserves most of the tractability of the standard exponen-
tial function and practically mimics the qualitative property of the hyperbolic function
at the same time. It also encompasses exponential function as its special case when
 = 1.
Under this assumption of quasi-hyperbolic preferences, Laibson (1996) took a game-
theoretic approach where an individual is modelled as a collection of temporal selves
who make a decision on the consumption level in their respective periods. The self at
each period t inherits wealth (W t 1t ) from the previous self at time (t  1) and chooses
a ow of current and future consumption (ctt) maximizing discounted lifetime utility. If
we conne our time horizon to a nite T periods, the objective function which self t
wants to maximize is
Ut = u(c
t
t) +
T tX
i=1
iu(ctt+i); (125)
where  and  are discount parameters and the utility function, u(ct) is assumed to be
simple logarithm utility function, log(ct) for simplicity. The budget constraint is simply
written as
W tt+1 = R(W
t
t   ctt); 0  ctt  W tt ; ctT = W tT ; (126)
where R is a xed rate of gross return on wealth and the initial level of wealth (W 00 )
is given. Suppose that the decision is made at time 0. The rst-order conditions for
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maxmization problem (125) subject to (126) faced by self of time 0 are
c01
c00
= R;
c0t+1
c0t
= R for t = 1:::T   1
From (126), we can notice that c0t = W
0
t  W 0t+1=R from t = 0 to t   1 and c0T = W 0T .
Then
W 0t  
W 0t+1
R
= tRt(W 00  
W 01
R
) for t = 1:::T   1;
W 0T = 
TRT (W 00  
W 01
R
).
Recursively the level of wealth at time t can be derived as
W 0t =
"
tRt
T tX
i=0
i
#
(W 00  
W 01
R
):
Then nally we can get to the series for W 0t ,the level of wealth at time t chosen by the
self at time 0, all expressed with the current wealth endowment, W 00 :
W 0t =
tRt
PT t
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT 1
i=0 
i
W 00 :
From the perspective of the self at time 0, it would be optimal that his solution se-
quences, fc0tgTt=0 and fW 0t gTt=0 are realized by future selves. However, in this model, we
do not assume any commitment mechanism through which the self of time t has the
ability to force future selves to stick to his choices. Then the role of self 0 just ends
once he consumes c00 and passes the remaining wealth, R(W
0
0   c00) to the next period.
At time 1, self 1 should choose his own consumption and wealth sequences taking
his initial endowment, W 01 = R(W
0
0   c00) as given. The optimizing procedure of self 0
can be applied to the case of self 1 in the same way, so the level of wealth (W 1t ) at time
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t chosen by self 1 can be expressed with W 01 , his initial wealth as
W 1t =
t 1Rt 1
PT t
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT 2
i=0 
i
W 01 :
At time 2 and onwards, selves at each time period, p repeat this process again and then
the general decision rule for the level of wealth at time t chosen by the self at time p,
W pt is dened as
W pt =
t pRt p
PT t
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT (p+1)
i=0 
i
W p 1p ; t = (p+ 1):::T;
where W p 1p is the initial wealth for the self at p. Selves at each period, p, dene their
wealth sequence throughout all the remaining life-time in this manner, but their plan
cannot actually be realized except for the choice of the level of wealth for the next
period, p + 1. Therefore, the realized sequence for the level of wealth, fWtgTt=0 can be
expressed as
Wt+1 =
R
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
Wt;
where W0 = W 00 ; Wt = W
t 1
t . Notice that self of (t   1) chose the optimal level of
wealth at time (t+ 1), W t 1t+1 as
W t 1t+1 = 
2R2
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT t
i=0 
i
W t 2t 1 , (127)
but the realized wealth at time (t+ 1) implemented by self of time t is
Wt+1 = W
t
t+1 =
R
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
 R
PT t
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT t
i=0 
i
W t 2t 1 .
It can be observed that
W tt+1 = W
t 1
t+1 

PT t
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
: (128)
When 0 <  < 1, W tt+1 is always smaller thanW
t 1
t+1 andW
t
t+1 = W
t 1
t+1 holds if and only
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if  = 19. Since the case with  = 1 represents an exponential discount function, the
result (128) conrms that there is no inconsistency issue when standard exponential
preferences are assumed. When  is less than one, every self at t wants to relish more
pleasure from the current consumption and pass disutility from saving onto future
selves. Thus, the realized savings are always smaller than those expected by previous
selves.
So far consumers have been assumed to be naivein a sense that they just repeat the
revision process every period even though they observe that future selves do not abide by
their optimal choices. Let us suppose now that the present self is sophisticatedenough
to anticipate the future selfs saving behaviour and considers this prediction as one of
constraints on his life-time utility maximization problem. The addition of consumer
sophistication enables us to understand this model as a game between present self
and future selves as intended earlier in Phelps and Pollak (1968). Then the backward
induction method can be used to nd a sub-game perfect equilibrium. This strategy
where a consumer seeks to nd a future plan that he actually will follow was named
consistent planningin Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). As the name implies literally,
intertemporal inconsistency is not an issue any more, because the planned consumption
and saving by self of t are actually implemented by his future selves.
Returning back to the optimization problem of the present self at time 0, the self of
time 0 can reason now that the self of time T   1 would choose his consumption level
(cT 1) to maximize lifetime utility UT 1 = u(cT 1T 1) + u(c
T 1
T ) with budget constraint
W T 1T = R(W
T 2
T 1  cT 1T 1) and cT 1T = W T 1T . W T 2T 1 is taken as given to the self of T  1
from his previous self. The decision rule for W T 1T is
W T 1T =
R
1 + 
W T 2T 1 . (129)
The current self also knows that the self of time T   2 considers in his consumption
9 
PT t
i=0 
i
1+
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
=

PT t
i=0 
i
1+(
PT t
i=0 
i 1) =

PT t
i=0 
i
(1 )+PT ti=0 i < 1 when  < 1 and 
PT t
i=0 
i
(1 )+PT ti=0 i = 1
when  = 1:
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decision the fact that his next self, the self of time T   1 is going to spend and save
according to (129). Solving the problem of self of T   2;
maxUT 2 = u(cT 2T 2) + u(c
T 2
T 1) + 
2u(cT 2T )
s.t. W T 2T 1 = R(W
T 3
T 2   cT 2T 2), cT 2T 1 = 11+W T 2T 1 , cT 2T = R1+W T 2T 1 with an inherited
value of W T 3T 2 , we can get the decision rule for W
T 2
T 1 as
W T 2T 1 =
R(1 + )
1 + (1 + )
W T 3T 2 .
Repeating this procedure, a general decision rule for fWtgTt=0 can be described as
Wt+1 =
R
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
1 + 
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
Wt;
which turns out to be the same with the result from the naive consumer case in (127).
The identity of the results from naiveand sophisticatedconsumer obviously stems
from the logarithmic utility assumption as pointed out in ODonoghue and Rabin
(1999).
From the results we have derived so far, we can compare the saving behaviours of
the two types of consumers. The rst case which will be called commitment choice
assumes that the consumer can commit to their initial choice. The other is the case
where the consumer is naive or sophisticated, which will be called equilibrium choice.
If we dene saving ratio as st = (Wt   ct)=Wt, the saving ratios of commitment(sct)
and equilibrium(set) are
commitment : sc0 =

PT 1
i=0 
i
1+
PT 1
i=0 
i
sct =
PT t
i=0 
i 1PT t
i=0 
i for 1  t  T
equilibrium : set =

PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
1+
PT (t+1)
i=0 
i
for 0  t  T:
(130)
As long as  is smaller than one, it is clear that sct > s
e
t except for the current time,
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i.e. sc0 = s
e
0. To sum up, the consumer with quasi-hyperbolic preferences always ends
up saving less in the future than his initial plan. Now we face a more fundamental
question: is it better from a welfare perspective to force the consumer to stick to his
initial choice by providing a commitment mechanism? However, a welfare comparison
between commitment and equilibrium choice is very troublesome, since any choice fails
to be unanimously supported by all selves. Denitely the commitment saving-ratio at
time t, sct is welcomed by all selves except the self of time t who prefers s
e
t and the
choice of set by the self of time t can make himself better-o¤ while making all other
period selves worse-o¤. For this reason, a Pareto-dominance relation cannot be dened
between these two choices.
To address this problem, some literature such as ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)
assume that a social planner is not as myopic or impatient as an individual consumer
and has a long-term perspective criterion which is normally represented by standard
exponential preferences, i.e.  = 1. Then from this social planners point of view, all
periods selves except the current consumer are undersaving, which provides grounds
for policy intervention to correct the consumers behaviour. However, this approach is
problematic since it is di¢ cult to justify the di¤erence in preference between a planner
and an individual consumer. For example, the self at time T   1 voluntarily chooses
to save set of his income which is smaller than what the planner expects him to do,
while being fully conscious of the fact that his undersaving now will reduce what he
can consume in the last period, T . Then there is no proper rationale for the planner
insisting his preferred saving ratio against the will of an individual consumer. The
alternative which is adopted, for example, in Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1996) is to explore the innite-time behaviour in (130). The discussion of this matter
continues in the next section.
Innite-time behaviour and policy implication In the innite-period horizon
with T = 1, it is straightforward in (130) to show that the equilibrium saving ratio,
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set converges to a unique saving ratio, s
e :
se =

1   +  : (131)
Now that (131) is implying that all selves will choose the same saving ratio, se, the
question to be asked is now whether or not making all selves perturb their saving ratio
from se can make all better-o¤. According to Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1996), the answer is yes. Following the reasoning of Laibson (1996), suppose that the
current self can pick a life-time saving ratio (s) and all future selves should follow it.
Then s satises
s = arg max
s
ln [(1  s)W ] + 
1X
i=1
i ln

(1  s)siRiW  ; (132)
where W is the initial wealth of the current self. Solving problem (132), it can be
obtained that
s =

(1  )2 + (1  ) > s
e;
for 0 < ;  < 1. It is clear, then, that making all selves including the current self stick
to the saving ratio s provides more life-time utility to the current self even though
he should sacrice some of the current consumption. All future selves will agree with
this current selfs action because they can inherit more wealth from the previous self.
Therefore, as Laibson (1996) pointed out, s Pareto-dominates se. In addition, he also
showed that the saving ratio from a standard exponential preference case can Pareto-
dominate se in (131) if  is su¢ ciently close to unity. So it can be said that as long as
a consumers impatience is weak enough a social planner has a good reason to believe
that exponential preferences could give, if not an optimal, at least a better guideline
for the economy.
Liabson (1996) suggests two policy interventions to address this undersaving be-
haviour of impatient consumers. The rst is to restrict the liquidity of saving by
requiring advance notication to spend saving on consumption. Liabson shows that
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just an one-period delay of the timing of consumption can restore the saving rate of the
economy with exponential preferences. The other option for commanding the desired
saving rate is for the government to implement an interest subsidy and a penalty to
over-consumption at the same time. Liabson takes his argument on a negative capital
income tax rate or interest subsidy for optimality as an example where the Chamley-
Judd zero capital taxation result does not hold. These two policy interventions can
be justied because they can provide more welfare than the competitive equilibrium
without intervention. However, we should notice that there is still an implicit assump-
tion behind these results. Whoever implements these interventions, all the reasoning
in Liabson (1996) assumes that the central planner or the government should commit
to its policy. If this commitment assumption is relaxed, say the planner or the govern-
ment is as impatient as an individual consumer, policy intervention can lead to a worse
outcome as shown in Krusell et al (2002). We will discuss this case in the next section.
4.2.2 Quasi-hyperbolic Preference in a Standard Ramsey Growth Model
In this section, we will review the growth model with quasi-hyperbolic preferences in
Krusell et al (2002). The model is no more than a standard Ramsey growth model ex-
cept for the assumption that consumers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences which implies
the following form of consumerslifetime utility, Ut :
Ut = u(ct) +
T tX
i=1
iu(ct+1); 0 < ;  < 1 ,
where the utility function is restricted to logarithmic function, u(ct) = ln(ct) again.
Consumers provide capital (kt) and xed amount of labour e¤ort to rms which have a
Cobb-Douglas production technology, f(kt) = Akt . The cost of capital and labour in
perfect competition is the marginal product of each input so that it holds
rt = Ak
 1
t and wt = (1  )Akt . (133)
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Consumers take these prices as given and aim to maximize their life-time utility subject
to their resource constraint,
kt+1 = rtkt + wt   ct,
where full depreciation of capital is assumed.
Competitive Equilibrium and Planners Choice
(a) Competitive Equilibrium A sophisticated consumer in this model follows
exactly the same steps as the consumer in the previous section. For a nite life-time,
T , the consumer at time t predicts the action of his future self at time T and derives
the whole sequence of consumption from t to T recursively. This backward induction
gives us the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Krusell et al, 2002) For our economy, the competitive equilibrium time
path for capital is
kt+1 =

1   + Ak

t . (134)
Proof. Firstly, the current self knows that the self of T   1 chooses his consumption
and saving by solving
max
kT
UT 1 = u(cT 1) + u(cT ) s:t
cT 1 = rT 1kT 1 + wT 1   kT
cT = rTkT + wT :
The solution gives a prediction for kT as
kT =

1 + 
(rT 1kT 1 + wT 1)  1
1 + 
wT
rT
. (135)
This decision rule for kT is considered as one of constraints in the self of T   2 who
solves the problem,
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max
kT 1
UT 2 = u(cT 2) + u(cT 1) + 
2u(cT ) s:t
ct = rtkt + wt   kt+1 for t = T   2; T   1
cT = rTkT + wT and (135).
The decision rule of the self of T   2 for kT 1 can be obtained as
kT 1 =
 + 2
1 +  + 2
(rT 2kT 2 + wT 2)  1
1 +  + 2

wT 1
rT 1
+
wT
rT 1rT

:
This process is repeated by all the future selves from T   3; and nally the current self
at t can dene his law of motion in capital as
kt+1 =

PT t
i=1 
i
1 + 
PT t
i=1 
i
(rtkt + wt)  1
1 + 
PT t
i=1 
i
TX
i=t+1
wiQi
j=t+1 rj
(136)
As T !1, the rst term of right-hand side in (136) converges to 
1 + .
To obtain the innite behaviour of the second term of right-hand side in (136),
it is necessary to guess that the consumer would have the law of motion of capital
kt+1 = sAk

t in the innite-period horizon. Combining this guess with rt and wt in
(133), we can get the simplied form of wiQi
j=t+1 rj
and
PT
i=t+1
wiQi
j=t+1 rj
as
wiQi
j=t+1 rj
=
1  

si (t+1)kt+1; (137)
1X
i=t+1
wiQi
j=t+1 rj
=
1  
(1  s)kt+1:
By inserting (137) into (136), we can get to the law of motion in capital in innite time
in Proposition 1.
(b) Planners Choice In a growth model with standard exponential preferences,
it is well known that the competitive equilibrium can also solve the planners problem
110
where the planner has the same preference as an individual consumer. That is, when
 = 1 in (134), the decision rule, kt+1 = Akt can be obtained from the planners
problem. However, Krusell et al (2002) showed that under quasi-hyperbolic preferences
this welfare theorem does not hold. To see this point, let us describe the planners
problem as
max
fcigTi=t
Ut = u(ct) +
T tX
i=1
iu(ct+1)
s:t ct = Ak

t   kt+1 for t = t:::T   1
cT = Ak

T :
Since this planner shares the preference structure with an individual consumer, the same
recursive planning is also applied here and gives an equilibrium for a central planner.
Proposition 8 (Krusell et al, 2002) In our economy, the central planners equilibrium
time path for capital is
kt+1 =

1   + Ak

t :
Proof. At T   1, the planner faces the following problem:
max
kT
UT 1 = u(cT 1) + u(cT ) s:t
cT 1 = AkT 1   kT
cT = Ak

T :
The solution gives a prediction for kT as
kT =

1 + 
AkT 1 (138)
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At time T   2, the planner solves the problem
max
kT 1
UT 2 = u(cT 2) + u(cT 1) + 
2u(cT ) s:t
ct = Ak

t   kt+1 for t = T   2; T   1
cT = Ak

T and (138).
The decision rule of the self of T   2 for kT 1 can be obtained as
kT 1 =
 + 22
1 +  + 22
AkT 2
The backward reasoning nally leads us to the law of motion in capital as
kt+1 =

PT t
i=1 
ii
1 + 
PT t
i=1 
ii
Akt :
As T !1, the result of proposition 2 can be obtained.
(c) Welfare comparison of two equilibrium and policy implication From
proposition 1 and 2, let the saving ratio of the competitive equilibrium and the planners
equilibrium be sCE and sP respectively. It is straightforward to see that sCE > sP . Now
following Krusell et al (2002), the value function of the current self, Vo(k) can be dened
as
V0(k) = u(f(k)  k0) + V (k0);
where V (k) = u(f(k)   k0) + V (k0) and k, k0 are the capital level of the current and
the next period respectively. Then we can nd a stationary saving ratio that maximizes
V0(k), which is di¤erent from sCE and sP .
Proposition 9 (Krusell et al, 2002) In our economy, there exists s such that
s = arg max
s
fV0(k) = u(f(k)  k0) + V (k0)g;
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and s > sCE > sP . Therefore the competitive equilibrium provides higher welfare than
the planners solution.
Proof. This proof is a simple summary of that in Krusell et al (2002). If we suppose
that a consumer saves at a xed rate such that k0 = sAk, we can write V (k) as
V (k) =
1X
t=0
tu((1  s)Akt ),
where u(c) = ln c and k0 = k. Then we can obtain an explicit form of V0(k) as
V0(k) = ln(1 s)Ak+

ln(1  s)
1   +
 ln s
(1  )(1  ) +
lnA
(1  )(1  ) +
 ln sAk
1  

:
Then it is straightforward to obtain
s =

(1  )(1   + ) +  ; (139)
and check s > sCE > sP . Finally since V0(k) is monotonically increasing for s < s,
sCE implies more welfare than sP .
Normally, a central planner is assumed to have the ability to catch what a competi-
tive consumer would miss. The planner here knows that his action will a¤ect the return
to savings of future periods while competitive agents act just as price-takers, so that
the expected marginal product of capital perceived by the planner should be lower than
one of the competitive consumers. Then the planner saves less than the competitive
equilibrium, which results in a worse performance in welfare in a situation where the
competitive equilibrium already shows undersaving behaviour. As a consequence, if we
think of the planner as the government with various tax instruments whose objective
is to maximize the life-time utility of the current electorate who has quasi-hyperbolic
preferences, its taxation plan should include a disincentive to save, e.g. a positive tax
rate on capital income in Krusell et al (2002) and so its tax intervention guides the
economy in the wrong direction.
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4.3 Quasi-hyperbolic Preferences in a GrowthModel with Pub-
lic Spending: Barro meets Laibson
In this section we embrace quasi-hyperbolic preferences into a growth model with pro-
ductive public spending. The government spending provides a complementary input
factor to the production function of the private sector as in Barro (1990). Since the
competitive equilibrium cannot be Pareto-optimal in its nature when there exists an
externality, our main interest in this chapter is in the di¤erence in the optimal tax
policy resulting from quasi-hyperbolic preferences. First, we compare the competitive
equilibrium with the rst-best choice in a centrally-planned economy. Second, we ex-
plore second-best taxation from the Ramsey scal policy approach with three di¤erent
degrees of commitment: full commitment, complete absence of commitment, and one-
period partial commitment when a lump-sum tax is not available.
4.3.1 Model Description
The model assumes a representative consumer who obtains utility from his life-time
consumption and leisure. We adopt the quasi-hyperbolic preference structure given by
Ut = u(ct; lt) + 
1X
i=1
iu(ct+i; lt+i):
We assume that the consumers utility function is
u(c; l) =  ln c+ (1  ) ln(1  l),
where c is consumption and l is labour e¤ort.
The aggregate resource constraint in our economy is assumed to be
ct + kt+1 = (1  )yt;
where y is total production and  is the ratio of productive government spending with
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respect to the total output. The productive government spending (gt = yt) works as a
complementary input factor in the production process where the production technology
is dened as
yt = Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t ,
where  is assumed to be between zero and one.
We assume that the government collects tax revenue to nance government spending
with a lump-sum tax, and capital and labour income taxes. Thus, its budget constraint
reads
gt =  krtkt +  lwtlt +Mt = yt;
where  k and  l are the constant capital and labour income tax rates respectively,
and Mt is the lump-sum tax. Under the assumption of perfect competition in product
markets, we can apply marginal-product pricing of input factors to capital and labour:
rt = Ak
 1
t l
1 
t g
1 
t and wt = A(1  )k 1t l t g1 t :
4.3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we will search for an equilibrium of a representative consumer in the
competitive market. The process to obtain a closed-form equilibrium is the same as
that we adopted in the standard Ramsey growth model. The representative agent
can internalize his inconsistency in the optimization process by applying a backward
induction technique. The following proposition describes the saving-rule for the rep-
resentative consumer who takes factor prices and all tax variables as exogenous. The
rst proposition describes the consumers behaviour in a nite-time horizon.
Proposition 10 In a nite-time period, T , the saving rule for the representative agent
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is
kt+1 =

PT t
i=1 
i
+ 
PT t
i=1 
i
((1  k)rtkt+(1  l)wtlt Mt)  
+ 
PT t
i=1 
i
TX
i=t+1

(1   l)wi  Mi
ij=t+1(1   k)i trj

:
(140)
Proof. See appendix.
Using (140), we can derive the consumers saving and labour choice behaviour in an
innite time setting. The result is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 In the innite-period horizon, the competitive equilibrium values for
capital and labour are
kt+1 =

1   +  (1   k)Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t ; (141)
lt = lCE =
(1  )(1   l)(1   + )
(1  )(1   l)(1   + ) + (1  ) [(1  )(1   k)  
(1   + )] ;
(142)
where 
 =     k   (1  ) l. At the equilibrium, the economy grows at the constant
rate
CE =

1   +  (1   k)
(1 )=A1=l(1 )=CE :
Proof. See appendix.
If we assume that there is no productive government spending, (141) and (142)
correspond to the saving rule and labour choice in the standard Ramsey growth model
which was shown earlier in Krusell et al (2000). Because of our log-utility function
specication, the labour income tax rate does not involve the saving function which
shows the same form as the inelastic labour case where  = 1. As is typical in Barro-
type growth models, the economy shows a balanced growth path without any transition
dynamics. Output, capital and consumption grow at a constant rate, so that the lump-
tax rate (Mt=yt) is also constant.
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4.3.3 Planners Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality
In this section, we assume that there is a central planner who is a representative of
the consumer and is able to fully dictate savings and labour choice decision. The cen-
tral planner is assumed to be given a xed ratio of government spending to output, .
Since this central planner recognizes the positive externality from the productive public
spending and the consequent higher return on capital and labour than a competitive
agent, it is evident that the economy governed by the central planner shows higher sav-
ing rates than a competitive equilibrium. We assume that the central planner inherits
quasi-hyperbolic preferences from the representative consumer, so that he also resolves
his inconsistency problem by applying the consistent planning technique. Backward
induction of the central planner himself provides us the following two propositions.
Proposition 12 In a nite-time period, T , the saving rule for the central planner is
kt+1 =

PT t
i=1 
i
1 + 
PT t
i=1 
i
(1  )A1=(1 )=kt:
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 13 In the innite-period horizon, the equilibrium choices of the central
planner for capital and labour are
kt+1 =

1   +  (1  )Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t ; (143)
lt = lP =
(1  )(1   + )
(1   + )(1  ) + (1  )(1  ): (144)
At the equilibrium, the economy grows at the constant rate
P =

1   +  (1  )
(1 )=A1=l(1 )=P : (145)
Proof. See appendix.
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(143) and (144) describes the best resource allocation rule for the central planner
for a given . In a standard exponential preferences case, this solution for the central
planner serves as a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. However, because of the quasi-hyperbolic
preferences structure, the central-planner fails to obtain Pareto-optimality as we already
observed in the standard Ramsey growth model case in Krusell et al (2000, 2002). This
fact can be veried by simply showing that there is another stationary saving ratio or
growth rate that can make selves in all periods better o¤. Of course, the existence of
that kind of saving ratio requires a commitment scheme which prevents all future selves
of the central planner from deviating from the chosen saving ratio. In this sense, the
welfare loss from choosing the saving rule, (143) can be interpreted as the cost of a lack
of commitment. The following proposition shows a closed-form rule for Pareto-optimal
saving and labour choice in this economy. Let s denote the saving ratio to disposable
income such that kt+1 = s(1   )(1 )=A1=l(1 )=t kt. Then the equilibrium saving
ratio of the central planner is sP = 
1 + :
Proposition 14 There exists a stationary saving ratio (s) and labour choice (l) that
Pareto-dominates the central planners choice, sP and lP such that
s = arg max
s
V0(k);
where V0(k) = u(k; k0; l) + V (k0) and V (k) = u(k; k0; l) + V (k0): The closed-form of
s; l and  are
s =

(1  )(1   + ) +  ; (146)
l =
(1  ) [(1  )(1   + ) + ]
(1  ) [(1  )(1   + ) + ] + (1  )(1  )(1   + ) ;
 =

(1  )(1   + ) +  (1  )
(1 )=A1= (l)(1 )= : (147)
Proof. See appendix.
It is clear that s > sP . Since V0(k) is monotonically increasing for s < s, the
central planner is under-saving at his equilibrium. sP cannot be Pareto-e¢ cient in the
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sense that a marginal upward deviation from sP can make all of the central planners
selves including the current-period self better o¤. An increased V0(k) denitely means
that it is a better choice for the current central planner and more saving by the current
planner is always benecial to all of future selves because they can inherit more initial
wealth from their predecessors, while s satises Pareto-optimality since any deviation
from it does harm to at least one self. For s < s, all future selves would not be happy
and for s > s, there is no motivation for the current consumer to choose that saving
ratio by sacricing his consumption. Comparing (146) with (139), the optimal saving
rule for the standard Ramsey growth model, we can notice that (146) is a special case
of (139) where  = 1, which is not surprising since it is well known that Barro-type
growth model shows the same growth dynamics as the AK economy.
4.3.4 Optimal Taxation
In the previous section, we have identied the saving and labour choice behaviour in a
competitive economy and a centrally-planned economy. With exponential preferences,
we can dene the optimal tax plan as one that can implement the central-planners
rst-best resource allocation which is Pareto-optimal. But we have shown that the
central planner cannot achieve Pareto-optimality, so the tax plan dened in that way
does not deserve to be called optimal. Therefore, we need to nd another tax schedule
that can achieve true optimality in a competitive economy.
Before we see the specic tax schedule, we should notice that sP and s are con-
strained allocation rules where the central planner takes the share of public spending,
 as given. Only if the central planner is allowed to also choose  at its optimal level,
can an allocation rule in that situation be called the rst-best or Pareto-optimal choice.
Barro (1990) showed earlier that when the economy with a Cobb-Douglas production
technology is in a position of balanced growth the utility maximizing public spending
ratio to output (P ) coincides with the one that maximizes the growth rate, p. Since
labour choice is independent from the choice of , Barros argument can be applied to
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our model. From the previous propositions, the optimal public spending ratio to output
can be straightforwardly dened as in the following statement.
Proposition 15 The optimal ratio of public spending to output () for the central
planner is
P = 1  :
Proof. Proof is straightforward from (145) and (147).
Now we can dene the capital and labour tax rates that can achieve the outcome
of the central-planner or the optimal resource allocation for the central planner in a
competitive equilibrium with the optimal ratio of productive public spending, P =
1  :
Proposition 16 (i) Capital and labour income tax rates that can implement the central
planners equilibrium choice in a competitive equilibrium are
Pk = 0 and 
P
l = 1 when  = 1,
Pk = 0 and 
P
l = 0 when 0 <  < 1.
(ii) Capital and labour income tax rates that can implement the central planners
optimal choice in a competitive equilibrium are
 k =
 (1  )(1  )
(1  )(1   + ) +  < 0 and 

l = 1 

1  

k > 1 when  = 1; (148)
 k =
 (1  )(1  )
(1  )(1   + ) +  < 0 and 

l = 0 when 0 <  < 1:
Proof. Proof is straightforward.
In the rst statement, the labour tax part is in fact trivial. When the utility function
does not contain leisure, the labour income tax works in the exactly same way that a
lump-sum tax does. In that case, full conscation of labour income is chosen to attain
rst-best outcome. In the case of elastic labour supply, the result implies that uniform
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Figure 19: Growth Rates in Three Environments
tax rates for capital and labour income are required for replicating the central planners
choice. However, if an additional distortionary tax instrument is added, for example,
a consumption tax, the labour income tax does not need to be zero, while zero-capital
tax rate result still holds.
Figure 19 summarizes the rst statement. It shows the growth rate for a xed size
of public spending to total output in three environments: central planners growth rate
(solid line), growth rate in a decentralized economy where public spending is nanced
with uniform income tax (dotted line) and growth rate in a decentralized economy where
public spending is nanced with a lump-sum tax (dashed line). The parameter values
are  = 0:3;  = 0:5;  = 0:95. The central planners economy shows its maximum
growth rate at  = 0:7 which is equals to 1  and this growth rate can be accomplished
by nancing public spending only with a lump-sum tax.
The rst statement in the proposition shows a di¤erent result to Krusell et al (2002)
where a non-zero capital tax is required for implementation of the central planners
choice in a competitive equilibrium. As long as the central planner su¤ers from incon-
sistency arising from quasi-hyperbolic preferences, the central planners equilibrium is
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still the rst-best outcome attainable in this economy regardless of whether it is optimal
or not. In a standard Ramsey growth model, quasi-hyperbolic preferences result in a
worse-o¤ outcome which is achieved by a positive capital tax rate. However, in a Barro-
type growth model, quasi-hyperbolic preferences do not require a non-zero capital tax
rate to replicate the central-planners rst-best outcome.
Since the rst-best outcome achieved by zero-distortionary taxes is not optimal for
the economy, we can dene optimal income tax rates to attain a Pareto-optimal resource
allocation, which is described in the second statement of the proposition. It says that
a negative capital income tax or a subsidy to capital income is optimal for any value of
. When  = 1, it seems rather problematic that the optimal labour income tax rate
is greater than unity. If labour income tax rate cannot exceed 1, the Pareto-opitmal
outcome cannot be obtained since the capital income tax should be left untaxed. In
this case, an introduction of another tax instrument such as a consumption tax can
help restore the Pareto-optimality since it also plays a role of lump-sum tax when the
labour supply is xed.
It is rather surprising that the optimal labour income tax rate is still zero when
labour supply is endogenous. In a competitive economy, the agents undersaving results
from two facts. Firstly, the agent fails to internalize the positive externality from the
productive public spending and secondly, quasi-hyperbolic preferences force the agent
to choose to save less. The rst part of undersaving is corrected by nancing public
spending only with a lump-sum tax and the second part of undersaving can be corrected
by increasing the lump-sum tax further and providing a subsidy to capital income while
labour income remains untaxed.
Figure 20 summarizes the second statement in the proposition. We add one more
case, the optimal growth rate for the central planner (Bold solid line) to the rst gure
with the same parameters. The optimal growth rate is also maximized when the size
of government is equal to (1   ) = 0:7, but this growth rate cannot be implemented
in a decentralized economy with a lump-sum tax only. At  = 0:7, the lump-sum tax
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Figure 20: Growth Rates in Four Environments
generates a closer growth rate than the income tax; therefore the lump-sum tax would
still be preferred here. The optimal tax strategy is then to increase the lump-sum tax
and provide a subsidy to capital income with the excess of lump-tax revenue over the
optimal size of the government until the growth rate coincides with the optimal growth
rate.
4.3.5 Ramsey Fiscal Policy and Consistent Taxation
In the previous section, we have seen how optimal tax rates can be dened from the
perspective of a central planner, meaning the policy maker is assumed to be be able
to employ non-distortionary tax instruments, e.g. a lump-sum tax. In this section, we
take a di¤erent but more realistic approach, the so called "Ramsey approach" where a
government with only distortionary tax instruments has to determine the optimal tax
schedule subject to the agentsbehaviour and the resource constraint in a competitive
economy.
Since the consumer has quasi-hyperbolic preferences, the government in each period
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should also experience an inconsistency problem in their optimal tax plan. That is, the
optimal tax schedule for the next period set by the current government should always
be revised by the next periods government. As a consequence, the equilibrium tax
schedule should be dened under the constraint of lack of commitment. We call this
tax schedule consistent taxation.
Second-best Ramsey Fiscal Policy Before we discuss consistent taxation, we start
here by describing the second-best Ramsey policy where all of the governments through-
out time follow a pre-determined tax schedule. The governments problem in this case
is
max
 l;k
U = ln ct + (1  ) ln(1  lt) + 
1X
i=t+1
i [ln ci + (1  ) ln(1  li)] : (149)
This optimization problem has four constraints: a budget constraint for an agent (150),
capital (151) and labour (152) choice rules for an agent in the decentralized economy
and the governments balanced-budget constraint (153).
ct = (1   l)wtlt + (1   k)rtkt   kt+1; (150)
kt+1 =

1   +  (1   k)Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t ; (151)
lt =
(1   l)(1  )(1   + )
(1   l)(1  )(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )(1   k): (152)
gt =  krtkt +  lwtlt: (153)
By embedding all of these constraints into the objective function, we can simplify the
life-time utility in (149) as
U(k; l) = U
c(k; l) + (1  )U l(k; l); (154)
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where k = (1   k), l = (1  )(1   l) and U c(k; l), U l(k; l) are dened by
U c =
1   + 
1   ln

l +
1  
1   + k

+

(1  )2 ln k +
1  


1   + 
1   +

(1  )2

ln
(1  l   k) l
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k + ;
U l =
1   + 
1   ln
(1   + )l + (1  )k
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k + :
 and  are collections of terms not including choice variables, k and l (For details,
see appendix). The rst-order conditions for maximization of (154) are
@U
@k
= 
@U c
@k
+ (1  )@U
l
@k
= 0; (155)
@U
@l
= 
@U c
@k
+ (1  )@U
l
@k
= 0;
where
@U c
@k
=
1   + 
(1   + )l + (1  )k +

(1  )2k
 1  


1   + 
1   +

(1  )2

1
1  l   k +
(1  )(1  )
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k

;
@U l
@k
=
1   + 
1  

1  
(1   + )l + (1  )k  
(1  )(1  )
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k

;
@U c
@l
=
1   + 
1  
1   + 
(1   + )l + (1  )k
 1  


1   + 
1   +

(1  )2

1
1  l   k  
1
l
+
1   + 
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k

;
@U l
@l
=
1   + 
1  

1   + 
(1   + )l + (1  )k  
1   + 
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k

:
When labour supply is inelastic ( = 1), these F.O.C provide us a clear view on the
second-best Ramsey policy. The optimal tax rates in that case are
k =
(1   + )
(1  )(1   + ) +  () k =  
(1  )(1  )
(1  )(1   + ) +  < 0;
l =   (1  )(1  )
(1  )(1   + ) +  ,  l =
(1  ) [(1  )(1   + ) + ] + (1  )(1  )
(1  ) [(1  )(1   + ) + ] > 1;
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which coincide with the optimal tax rates for the central planner dened in (148). This
is not surprising since the tax imposed on inelastic labour e¤ort has the property of a
lump-sum tax and we are assuming commitment capability for the central planner and
the government in each case.
On the other hand, when 0 <  < 1, the governments second-best scal policy
cannot be the same as the central planners optimal tax schedule as long as its tax
instruments are restricted to distortionary income taxes. On top of that, it is no longer
possible to nd closed-forms for k and l satisfying the rst-order conditions. In Table
1, we present some numerical examples of second-best taxation. From the results, it
is noticeable that the optimal tax mix of capital and labour income tax rates always
satises the condition that the size of the government to output,  =  k + (1   ) l
coincides with (1 ). Thus, the government decision is about how it can nance that
portion of public spending from capital and labour income tax. When the lump-sum
tax is dropped from the list of available tax instruments, any change in the capital
income tax rate should entail a corresponding change in the labour tax rate which can
maintain the optimal size of the government spending, . When there is an increase
in  k and a corresponding decrease in  l, it has mixed consequences on the life-time
utility of consumers. In a positive way, it decreases the saving ratio so that consumers
can consume more portion of their income. Also the new tax mix makes consumers
choose to work more, increasing total output of the economy. On the other hand, the
negative e¤ect is that less saving decreases total output of the economy and consumers
lose some utility from making more labour e¤ort. Therefore, the second-best tax rates
in Table 1 are the tax rates that equalize the marginal cost to the marginal benet of
the tax policy change.
The results in Table 1 shows that the more impatient the consumer (the smaller the
value of ) is, the higher the second-best capital tax rate is. The labour tax rate should
be correspondingly lower for smaller . This tax policy response to a change in  can
be explained in terms of the intertemporal utility trade-o¤. Suppose that the agent
gets more impatient (smaller ). Then the relative weight that the agent put on the
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 = 0:3  = 0:7
 = 0:7  = 0:3  = 0:7  = 0:3
  k  l  k  l  k  l  k  l
1.0 0.1840 0.9212 0.2555 0.8905 0.0867 0.7976 0.1178 0.7251
0.9 0.1911 0.9181 0.2652 0.8863 0.0894 0.7914 0.1216 0.7162
0.8 0.1993 0.9146 0.2763 0.8816 0.0925 0.7841 0.1261 0.7059
0.7 0.2090 0.9104 0.2893 0.8760 0.0963 0.7754 0.1312 0.6938
0.6 0.2207 0.9054 0.3048 0.8694 0.1008 0.7649 0.1374 0.6794
0.5 0.2351 0.8993 0.3237 0.8613 0.1064 0.7517 0.1450 0.6617
0.4 0.2535 0.8913 0.3475 0.8511 0.1137 0.7347 0.1546 0.6392
0.3 0.2785 0.8807 0.3791 0.8375 0.1237 0.7114 0.1675 0.6092
0.2 0.3151 0.8650 0.4242 0.8182 0.1386 0.6767 0.1860 0.5661
0.1 0.3780 0.8380 0.4984 0.7864 0.1645 0.6161 0.2166 0.4946
Table 1: Second-best Income Tax Rates
current-period utility compared with future periods increases, so that the government
needs to amend its tax policy to increase the current periods utility of the agent. (156)
shows the utility gain from the current period consumption and labour e¤ort,
u0 =  ln

l +
1  
1   +  k

+ 
1  

(ln l   ln(l(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )k)) (156)
+(1  )(ln(l(1   + ) + (1  )k)  ln (l(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )k) + ;
where  is the collection of terms not including choice variables. Since the optimal tax
mix should satisfy k + l = , a change in l; dl should be balanced by the change
in k; dk such that dk =  dl. Then the marginal utility of the current period with
respect to tax rate changes, du0 can be expressed only with dl as shown in (157). It
can be checked that du0 is positive for all the second best tax rates shown in Table 1,
which means that the marginal increase in l (marginal decrease in  l) provides more
utility in the current period. Thus, the optimal  l should decrease while  k increases
as  gets smaller.
du0 =
0B@ l(1 +)+(1 )k + 1  1l  
1 

+ (1  ) (1 )+
l(1 +)+(1 )(1 )k
1CA dl (157)
This result suggests a di¤erent implication for capital income tax from the previ-
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ous literature. Laibson (1996) and Krusell et al (2002) recommend that the govern-
ment mitigate the self-control problem stemming from quasi-hyperbolic preferences by
subsidizing the agents saving behaviour. This recommendation still holds as long as
lump-sum tax is an available option as we can see in Proposition 10. However, once the
lump-sum tax is dropped, the government should respond to the agents impatience by
increasing the capital income tax.
This observation also raises an important question: should the consumers short-run
impatience, ; be distinctively treated with a normal discount factor, ? As pointed
out in the previous literature, it is not easy to distinguish the saving behaviour of a
quasi-hyperbolic consumer from that of an exponential consumer. In our model, the
equilibrium with quasi-hyperbolic preferences parameter, (; ) is identical to the equi-
librium of a standard growth model with a discount rate, ^ = 
1 + . From the planners
view, the two equilibria should be considered completely di¤erent, since the former is
undersaving, while the latter is saving at its Pareto-optimal level. For the government
taking a Ramsey taxation approach, the distinction between these two cases may also
lead to a di¤erence in tax policy. Table 2 shows an example of how a failure to capture
quasi-hyperbolic preferences inuences the governments taxation decision. What we
can observe in Table 2 is that when the government views this economy as a standard
exponential world with discount factor, b instead of perceiving true quasi-hyperbolic
preferences, it levies a higher tax on capital income,which discourages capital accumu-
lation. The equilibrium under false exponential preferences has lower saving than the
equilibrium under true quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Therefore, a proper understanding
of consumerspreference structure is critical in diagnosing and correcting undersaving
in the economy in the Ramsey taxation approach.
Consistent Taxation The discussion of the second-best tax policy in the previous
section was based on the assumption of the governments commitment capability. In
this section, we will consider the tax policy in the situation where the government lacks
future commitment. In this case, the government should experience inconsistency in
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Quasi-hyperbolic Preferences [True] Exponential Preferences [False]
   k  l b  k  l
1.0 0.1840 0.9212 0.9500 0.1840 0.9212
0.9 0.1911 0.9181 0.9448 0.1931 0.9172
0.8 0.1993 0.9146 0.9383 0.2038 0.9127
0.7 0.2090 0.9104 0.9301 0.2165 0.9072
0.6 0.2207 0.9054 0.9194 0.2320 0.9006
0.95 0.5 0.2351 0.8993 0.9048 0.2514 0.8923
0.4 0.2535 0.8913 0.8837 0.2767 0.8814
0.3 0.2785 0.8807 0.8507 0.3119 0.8663
0.2 0.3151 0.8650 0.7917 0.3660 0.8431
0.1 0.3780 0.8380 0.6552 0.4675 0.7997
*  = 0:3,  = 0:7
Table 2: Observational Equivalence and Second-best Taxation
its tax policy. That is, the tax plan regarded as the best for the current government
should be revised by the government in the next period since that plan is not able to
serve as the best plan for any government other than the current one.
The fundamental strategy to obtain a time-inconsistent tax policy in this section
is based on the approach suggested by Krusell et al (2000, 2002). Suppose that the
current government at time 0 faces given sequences of capital and labour tax rates for
all future periods, all of which are assumed to be constant such that
f( kt ;  lt)g1t=1 = f( k;  l)g:
Then the current governments optimal tax choice for the current period, 0, (~ k; ~ l)
should satisfy the following conditions:
(i) (~ k; ~ l) solves
max
(~k;~ l)
U0(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l) = ln c0(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l) + ln l0(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l) + (158)

1X
t=1
t [ln ct(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l) + ln lt(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l)] :
(ii) ct(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l) and lt(~ k;  k; ~ l;  l) should be consistent with competitive equi-
librium.
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(iii) When (~ k; ~ l) = ( k;  l), we can call it a time-consistent tax policy equilibrium
in the sense that for all governments throughout all future periods there would be no
incentive to deviate from those tax rates.
We can nd an optimal, (~ k; ~ l) from the Ramsey approach where a consumers
competitive behaviour, global resource constraint, and governments balanced budget
constraint are all embedded into the objective function, (158). Thus, rstly we need to
identify a competitive equilibrium when consumers face tax rates, (~ k; ~ l) at the present
and ( k;  l) in the future, which is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 17 With the current period tax rates, (~ k; ~ l) and tax rates, ( k;  l) for
all future periods, the competitive equilibrium for a representative consumer is
k1 = s0(1   k) [(1  )(1  ~ l) + (1  ~ k)]Ak0 l1 0 g1 0 ; (159)
kt+1 =

1   +  (1   k)Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t for t  1;
l0 =
(1  )(1  ~ l)
(1  )(1  ~ l) + (1  )(1  ~ k   s0((1  )(1  ~ l) + (1  ~ k))) ;
lt =
(1  )(1   l)(1   + )
(1  )(1   l)(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )(1   k) for t  1;
where s0 =
1 k
(1 )(1  l)+(1 k)

1 + :
Proof. See appendix.
Since we identied an agents response to the governments scal policy in a decen-
tralized economy, the governments objective function in (158) can be rewritten with
respect to its choice variables, ~ k and ~ l as
max
~k;~l
U0 = (1 +

1   )
0B@ ln(~l + ~k) + 1  (ln(1  ~l   ~k)+
ln(
~l
~l+(1 )~k s0(1 )(~l+~k))
1CA (160)
+(1  ) ln(
~l + ~k
~l + (1  )~k   s0(1  )(~l + ~k)
) + ;
where ~k = (1   ~ k); ~l = (1   )(1   ~ l); s0 = 1 k(1 )(1  l)+(1 k)

1 +and  is a
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collection of terms not including ~ k and ~ l (See appendix for details). The rst-order
conditions for (160) can be written as
@U0
@~k
= 
1   + 
1  

1
~l + ~k
+
1  


  1
1  ~l   ~k
  (1  )(1  s0)
(1  s0(1  ))~l + (1  )(1  s0)~k

+(1  )

1
~l + ~k
  (1  )(1  s0)
(1  s0(1  ))~l + (1  )(1  s0)~k

;
@U0
@~l
= 
1   + 
1  

1
~l + ~k
+
1  


  1
1  ~l   ~k
+
1
~l
  1  s0(1  )
(1  s0(1  ))~l + (1  )(1  s0)~k

+(1  )

1
~l + ~k
  1  s0(1  )
(1  s0(1  ))~l + (1  )(1  s0)~k

:
From these F.O.C, we can observe some straightforward results in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 18 (i) When  = 1, at the equilibrium there is a set of consistent tax
rates,  :
 = f( k; l)j(1   k;) + (1  )(1   l) = g:
(ii) When 0 <  < 1, at the equilibrium the consistent tax rates, ( k; l) can be
dened as
 k; = 1;  l = 1  
1  :
Proof. (i) When  = 1, the two F.O.C provide identical equations,
1
~l + ~k
=
1  


1
1  ~l   ~k

:
(ii) When 0 <  < 1, there is no interior solution since there is an implicit assump-
tion that ~l and ~k should not be negative. Suppose that the corner solution is ~k = 0.
If we construct the Lagrangian by adding  ~k to the objective function, (160), F.O.C
would be changed into
@L
@~k
=
@U0
@~k
+  = 0 and
@L
@~l
=
@U0
@~l
= 0:
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When ~k = 0, @U0@~l = 0 at
~l = . And we can check that at (~k; ~l) = (0; ),  @U0@~k =
 > 0. Therefore, (~k; ~l) = (0; ) is the solution.
When labour supply is inelastic or  = 1, the proposition states that any combina-
tion of labour and capital income tax rates is well qualied as an equilibrium tax policy
as long as that tax mix can nance the optimal level of productive public spending. In
the expression of the objective function in (160), the future tax rates,  k and  l have
no marginal e¤ect when  = 1. Thus, the current government is indi¤erent to future
tax rates. And in (159), the saving ratio of the current period agent only depends on
future tax rates. As a result, the current government only cares about assuring that
the after-tax disposable income of the current period is maximized. This condition
is accomplished when the level of productive public spending is (1   ) regardless of
the tax policy composition used to nance it. It is also interesting to compare this
result with the optimal taxation from a perspective of the planner. As mentioned ear-
lier, when commitment is assumed, we can reach the same conclusion about optimal
taxation whether we take a central planners view or Ramsey taxation approach. In
both cases, it is optimal to implement a negative capital income tax rate and nance
the productive public spending plus subsidy to capital income with a labour income
tax. However, without commitment, the Ramsey taxation approach cannot pinpoint
the optimal taxation that a central planner can nd.
When labour supply is endogenous,  6= 1, the consistent taxation approach leads
to an equilibrium in which governments in all periods choose a tax plan where capi-
tal income is fully conscated while maintaining the required optimal level of public
spending. It is very obvious that all of the future governments will have no incentive
to deviate its policy from this tax plan simply because they will have no income to
tax at all. Under this equilibrium tax plan, the consumer in the current period does
not save so that there is no production from the next period. However, even though it
meets the condition of consistency, this tax plan should not actually be optimal for any
government considering that zero consumption in logarithmic utility means negative
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innity. A very innitesimally lower capital income tax that can gives some positive
saving is better than this worst equilibrium. The problem is that even for the capital
income tax rate as low as that myopic governments are still likely to be tempted by
the chance to enhance the welfare from their perspective by increasing the portion of
public spending nanced by the capital income tax. This untrustworthiness of future
governments is a fundamental reason why the worst outcome could happen when the
government lacks commitment to its tax policy.
Optimal Taxation with One-period Partial Commitment In the previous sec-
tion, we have found that the lack of commitment could lead to either uncertainty in
tax policy (inelastic labour supply case) or a bad equilibrium where there is no saving
at all (elastic labour supply case). In this section, we amend the assumption about
the commitment capability of the government. Suppose that the current government
can choose tax policy for the next period, while it should follow the tax policy set by
the previous government. In the same manner, the new government in the next period
will implement the tax policy which was decided by the current government and it will
choose tax policy for the next period. This assumption matches real practice better
concerning the time-lag of tax policy. Tax policy should be enforced at law by the prin-
ciple of no taxation without representation. Thus, it would take some time before the
decision on the change in tax policy is eventually put into practice after the legislation
process during which the old tax policy is still valid.
The strategy to nd an equilibrium is the same as the previous section. Suppose that
there are constant tax rates, ( k;  l); for all time periods. The current government is also
given ( k;  l) as its tax policy by the previous government and wishes to choose optimal
tax rates for the next period, (~ k; ~ l). If there is no incentive for the current government
to deviate from ( k;  l), so that ( k;  l) = (~ k; ~ l), we dene it as an equilibrium tax
policy. Before we set the optimization problem for the current government, we need
to identify a competitive equilibrium which should be included in constraints of the
governments problem.
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Proposition 19 Under the tax policy given as f tkg1t=0 = f k; ~ k;  k;  k:::g and f tlg1t=0 =
f l; ~ l;  l;  l:::g, the competitive equilibrium for a representative agent is
k1 =
~k
~l + ~k
(l + k)Ak

0 l
1 
0 g
1 
0 ; (161)
k2 =

1   + 
k
l + k
(~l + ~k)Ak

1 l
1 
1 g
1 
1 ; (162)
kt+1 =

1   + kAk

t l
1 
t g
1 
t for t  2; (163)
l0 =
k
l + (1  )(k   s) ; (164)
l1 =
~l
(1  (1  )s0)~l + (1  )(1  s0)~k
; (165)
lt = l =
l(1   + )
l(1   + ) + k(1  )(1  ) for t  2; (166)
where l = (1   )(1    l); k = (1    k); ~l = (1   )(1   ~ l); ~k = (1   ~ k);
 = (1   )(1   (1   )s0) + ;  = (1   )(1   (1   )s0) + (1 + );  =
(1 +)l+(1 )(1 )k
(1 +)(l+k) ; s =
~k
~l+~k
(l + k) and s0 =
k
l+k

1 + :
Proof. See appendix.
Using these competitive equilibrium conditions, the governments problem can be
dened as
max
~k;~l
U0 = U
c + (1  ) lnU l;
where U c and U l are given by
U c =
1   + 
1   ln

~l + ~k

  1   + 
1   ln

~l + ~k

+

1   ln
~k + (167)

1  
1  

ln(1  ~l   ~k) + 1   + 
1  
1  

ln l0 +

1  
1  

ln l1 +X;
U l = ln(1  l0) +  ln(1  l1) + Y; (168)
subject to global budget constraint, government balance-budget constraint and com-
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petitive equilibrium from (161) to (166) (See appendix for details). The rst-order
conditions are then derived as
@U0
@~l
= 
@U c
@~l
+ (1  ) ln @U
l
@~l
;
@U0
@~k
= 
@U c
@~k
+ (1  ) ln @U
l
@~k
;
where
@U c
@~l
=
1   + 
1  
1
~l + ~k
  1   + 
1  

~l + ~k
+
1   + 
1  
1  



~l + ~k
  (l + (1  )k)
	

 

1  
1  

1
1  ~l   ~k
+

1  
1  


1
~l
  (1  (1  )s0)


;
@U c
@~k
=
1   + 
1  
1
~l + ~k
  1   + 
1  

~l + ~k
+
1   + 
1  
1  



~l + ~k
  ((   (1  ))l + (1  ) (   ) k)
	

+

1  
1
~k
  
1  
1  

1
1  ~l   ~k
+

1  
1  


 (1  )(1  s0)


;
@U l
@~l
= (1 + )
1
~l + ~k
  (l + (1  )k)
	
   (1  (1  )s0)

@U l
@~k
= (1 +)
1
~l + ~k
  (   (1  ))l + (1  ) (   ) k
	
  (1  )(1  s0)

;
where 	 = ~l(l + (1   )k) + ~k((   (1   ))l + (1   ) (   ) k) and
 = (1  (1  )s0)~l + (1  )(1  s0)~k.
When the labour supply is inelastic ( = 1), the equilibrium derived from the F.O.C
is very simple as we can see in the following proposition.
Proposition 20 When  = 1, the equilibrium tax policy for the current government,
(~ k; ~ l) is
~ k = 0 and ~ l = 1.
135
Proof. From F.O.C above, the decision rule of (~k; ~l) of the current government can
be dened as
~k =  + ~l; ~l =   
1  
l
k + l
:
Therefore, for (~k; ~l) = (k; l) at equilibrium, (~k; ~l) should be (; 0), which corre-
sponds to tax rates, (~ k; ~ l) = (0; 1).
It is very interesting to see the fact that the optimal tax rates stated in proposi-
tion 14 actually coincide with the tax rates in proposition 10, which can obtain the
central planners rst-best choice in the decentralized economy. Proposition 14 implies
that even though it is assumed that the central planner is totally uncommitted, the
implementation of the best resource allocation of the central planner in the competitive
economy implicitly requires a guarantee that the government of the next period should
commit to the tax policy chosen by the government of the previous government.
When the labour supply is endogenous ( 6= 1), it is not possible to dene a closed-
form of the decision rule. In Table 3, we present equilibrium tax plans under one-
period commitment with the same parameter values used in Table 1. We saw in the
previous section an autarky equilibrium where the government conscates all of capital
income arising without commitment. Partial commitment being restored, we can notice
that a fairly low capital income tax rate appears at equilibrium while the level is still
larger than the second-best capital tax rate. It is also noticeable that the inuence of
impatience parameter, , is pretty much weakened now. We can observe again that as
 gets lower equilibrium capital income tax rate increases while labour income tax rate
decreases, however the change in tax rates is insignicantly small compared with Table
1.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider consumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences in a growth
model with productive public spending and explore the characteristics of the optimal
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 = 0:3  = 0:7
 = 0:7  = 0:3  = 0:7  = 0:3
  k  l  k  l  k  l  k  l
1.0 0.4415 0.8108 0.5875 0.7482 0.2370 0.4471 0.2799 0.3469
0.9 0.4425 0.8104 0.5877 0.7481 0.2383 0.4440 0.2806 0.3452
0.8 0.4437 0.8099 0.5881 0.7480 0.2399 0.4402 0.2815 0.3431
0.7 0.4451 0.8092 0.5886 0.7477 0.2437 0.4314 0.2825 0.3405
0.6 0.4470 0.8084 0.5893 0.7475 0.2457 0.4267 0.2840 0.3374
0.5 0.4495 0.8074 0.5898 0.7472 0.2493 0.4182 0.2879 0.3283
0.4 0.4529 0.8059 0.5914 0.7466 0.2543 0.4067 0.2941 0.3137
0.3 0.4580 0.8037 0.5932 0.7458 0.2615 0.3898 0.2960 0.3094
0.2 0.4665 0.8001 0.5961 0.7445 0.2733 0.3622 0.3043 0.2900
0.1 0.4831 0.7930 0.6019 0.7420 0.2972 0.3066 0.3232 0.2459
Table 3: Income Tax Rates under One-period Commitment
rates. Our rst question is whether quasi-hyperbolic preferences can make the same
di¤erence to the optimal tax rates compared to standard exponential preferences as the
results in Krusell et al (2002) for the Ramsey growth model. To explore this issue, we
assume an omniscient central planner who can govern the resource allocation of the
economy. According to Krusell et al (2002), this planner who shares quasi-hyprbolic
preferences with a representative agent, ends up implementing a non-zero capital income
tax that does harm to the economy in a standard Ramsey growth model. In our model,
however, we nd out that the rst-best tax plan that obtains a planners equilibrium
in a decentralized economy still coincides with the Chamley-Judd zero capital income
tax result. As long as a lump-sum tax is available, the planner will not use capital
income taxation to nance the productive public spending. Of course, the Pareto-
optimality of the planners rst-best equilibrium does not hold in our model either,
since undersaving behaviour is inevitable when there is dynamic inconsistency due to
quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Thus, a subsidy to capital income as an incentive to save
is an option that makes the economy better o¤, but this policy will be considered only
when the government can commit to the policy in the future.
We also investigate Ramsey taxation when the government has only two distor-
tionary tax instruments, a capital income tax and a labour income tax. In the central
planners approach, we do not restrict the availability of a lump-sum tax, so that it is
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assumed to be possible that the planner or government can nance the desirable level of
public spending without incurring any distortion of agentssaving and labour decisions.
In a very extreme case where there is no lump-sum tax available, the government should
adjust distortions from taxes up to the level where its objective, the maximization of its
electorateslife-time utility, is obtained as well as the optimal level of public spending
can be provided. Under this circumstance, the policy implications of quasi-hyperbolic
preferences on optimal taxation could be very di¤erent.
Firstly, the mitigation of the capital income tax burden to increase capital accumu-
lation may not be the correct measure to respond to increased impatience of consumers.
Rather it is a more desirable action for the government to increase the portion of public
spending nanced from the capital income tax and to encourage the consumers to work
more by decreasing the labour income tax. Secondly, the time-consistent tax schedule
for the government without commitment is the autarchy equilibrium where the capi-
tal income tax rate is one and the agent does not save at all. Thirdly, we observe a
much more moderate capital tax rate at the equilibrium when we allow just one-period
commitment power to the government.
Also, there are a couple of interesting observations in the case that labour supply is
xed. A lack of commitment power makes the government indi¤erent to tax plans as
long as they can nance a desired level of public spending. Finally, without commit-
ment, a rst-best tax policy from the perspective of the planners approach cannot be
implemented by a government who follows the Ramsey taxation approach. It turns out
that the planners rst-best tax plan is the one that is equilibrium for the government
with one-period partial commitment.
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5 Conclusion of the Thesis
In the thesis, we have presented three distinct works on the subject of scal policy.
The rst chapter studies the stabilizing role of income taxation. Our main focus in
this chapter is to settle the di¤erent policy implications existing in the early literature.
We start from the two-sector growth model of Benhabib and Farmer (1996) where
the di¤erence is the most striking and conclude that the assumption about how the
governments tax revenue is used plays a very critical role in choosing an appropriate
tax schedule to dampen belief-driven uctuations in the economy. When the tax revenue
is used to nance government spending which does not contribute to either production
or household utility, only progressive income tax can be used to secure the saddle-path
stability of the economy. The result of Guo and Harrison (2001) that the stabilizing
role of regressive taxation emerges for su¢ ciently large sector-specic externalities can
be attributed to the assumption that the tax revenue is repaid as a lump-sum transfer.
The assumption on the use of tax revenue also makes a signifant di¤erence in the
one-sector growth model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). The e¤ectiveness of progres-
sive taxation as an automatic stabilizer of sunspot uctuations in Guo and Lansing
(1998) has been regarded as an estabilished conclusion in the Benhabib and Farmer
(1994) model. However, we show that when a lump-sum transfer rather than waste-
ful government spending as in Guo and Lansing (1998) is assumed regressive income
tax can also stabilize the belief-driven uctuations. Furthermore, it turns out that the
capital income tax that is ignored in Guo (1999) can have a stabilizing e¤ect when
it is su¢ ciently regressive. The di¤erence in the stabilizing role between labour and
capital income tax stands out more in a growth model with productive government
spending in Chen and Guo (2010) as it is shown that less progressive capital income
tax is more e¤ective in eliminating indeterminacy while for the labour income tax larger
progressivity can reduce the probability of indeterminacy.
Even though it needs to be checked if these results hold under a wider set of func-
tional forms and parameter values, this chapter contributes to the existing literature
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by rstly taking notice of the importance of the assumption on the use of tax rev-
enue and identifying di¤erent roles of labour and capital income tax in addressing the
belief-driven business cycle in RBC models10.
The second chapter studies the optimal income tax structure in a Barro-type growth
model with decreasing-returns-to-scale technology and a public consumption good. We
characterize the rst-best optimum growth path chosen by a central planner and then
try to construct a tax policy that replicates this entire optimal growth path in a com-
petitive economy. The non-linearity of the income tax schedule is required as a constant
income tax rate that implements the rst-best steady-state in the long-run does not
replicate the growth path converging to the steady-state. The main nding in this
chapter is the optimality of a regressive tax schedule. When labour supply is xed, the
decentralized economy grows too quickly and a progressive tax worsens the excessively
rapid growth. In contrast, an intertemporally regressive income tax moves the decen-
tralized growth path closer to the optimal path, and a unique level of regressivity exists
for which the rst-best optimum is decentralized to a rst-order approximation. When
labour supply is endogenous, both the progressive and the regressive income taxation
can implement a welfare-improving growth path than the competitive equilibrium with
the constant income tax rate. However, regressive taxation turns out to be more e¤ec-
tive in replicating the central planners equilibrium since it can create an approximately
same growth-path to the rst-best while the progressive cannot.
It should be noted that the optimality of regressive taxation pretty much relies on
the model and the parameter values, so the result of this chapter should be interpreted
as a specic case where the regressive income tax can e¤ectively replicate the growth
path. It should also be pointed out that even if the regressive income tax is optimal,
it does not convey any redistributive implication. Our model considers an identical
agent, so that there is no need for redistribution policy. Rather, the result of this
chapter suggests that the the income tax rate should be intertemporally designed to
10In the Woodford (1989) and Grandmont et al (1998) framework, separate taxation for labour and
capital income is considered in Lloyd-Braga and Modesto (2012) and Gokan (2013). Gokan (2013)
conrms that labour and capital income taxes have di¤erent impacts on the indeterminacy.
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decrease as the economy grows.
The third chapter explores optimal taxation in a growth model with productive pub-
lic spending when consumers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences. This chapter takes two
di¤erent approaches to dening the optimal tax policy. First, we consider a ctitious
planning problem where the central planner shares the quasi-hyperbolic preferences with
a representative agent and we investigate tax policy that obtains the planners equi-
librium in a decentralized economy. To guarantee the implementation of the rst-best
outcome, we allow the government to use lump-sum tax or transfer. In a standard Ram-
sey growth model, Krusell et al (2002) earlier showed that a quasi-hyperbolic central
planner uses a positive income tax to implement the best equilibrium from his point of
view, which leads the economy to a worse equilibrium than the competitive equilibrium.
On the contrary, when the productive government spending creates a balanced-growth
path in the economy, this chapter shows that the tax policy that can implement the
rst-best optimum chosen by a central planner has a zero capital income tax rate. It is
also observed that quasi-hyperbolic preferences result in a failure of the rst-best choice
to attain Pareto-e¢ ciency. Negative capital income tax rates or a subsidy to capital
income can accomplish a better resource allocation than the rst-best choice.
Second, we investigate second-best taxation from the Ramsey scal approach where
a governement with only distortionary tax instruments has to determine the optimal
tax schedule subject to the agentsbehaviour and the resource constraint in a compet-
itive economy. When we assume that all of the governments throughout time follow a
pre-determined tax schedule, this approach interestingly suggests that the government
should respond to the agents impatience by increasing the capital income tax. This
result contrasts to the conclusion in most of the existing literature concerning quasi-
hyperbolic preferences that the recommended policy reponse to an increased impatience
is more subsidy to capital income nanced by non-distortinary lump-sum tax to attract
more capital accumulation to correct "under-saving" resulting from quasi-hyperbolic
preferences. We also show that in the case of a complete lack of commitment the
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time-consistent tax schedule can only induce a worst equilibrium where the government
conscates all of the capital income so that the agent does not save at all.
The analysis in this chapter is restricted to the log-utility and Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology since we pursue manageable closed-form solutions from recursive backward in-
duction and also want to exclude an indeterminate equilibria. When we depart from this
model set-up, the solutions should be approached approximately by numerial methods
as in Krusell et al (2002) and we leave this extension to the future research.
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Appendix
A Appendix for Chapter 4
Proof of proposition 10 With constant tax rates, k and  l, we dene Rt = (1   k)rt
and Wt = (1    l)wt. At the nal period, T , the consumer does not save, so only labour choice is
asked for him. The problem can be described as
max
lT
UT =  ln(cT ) + (1  ) ln(1  lT ) s:t
cT = RT kT +WT lT  MT with a given kT :
The optimal choice of lT is
lT = 1  (1  )

1 +
RT kT  MT
WT

: (169)
At time T   1, the representative agent knows that his future self will choose lT by (169) and
chooses his saving and labour keeping it in mind. That is, the agent at T   1 describes his life-time
utility maximization problem as
max
kT ;lT 1
UT 1 = u(cT 1; lT 1) + u(cT ; lT ) s:t
cT 1 = RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1   kT ;
cT = RT kT +WT lT  MT ;
lT = 1  (1  )

1 +
RT kT  MT
WT

The rst-order conditions are
@UT 1
@kT
=   
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1   kT + 
RT +WT
@lT
@kT
RT kT +WT lT  MT| {z }
A
  (1  )
@lT
@kT
1  lT| {z }
B
= 0;
(170)
@UT 1
@lT 1
=
WT 1
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1   kT  
1  
1  lT 1 = 0: (171)
From (169), @lT@kT =  (1  ) RTWT :
A =
RT
RT kT +WT lT  MT ;
B =   RT
RT kT +WT lT  MT :
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Thus, (170) can be simplied into

RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1   kT = 
RT
RT kT +WT lT  MT : (172)
From (171) and (172), the decision rules of capital and labour for the agent at T   1 are
kT =

+ 
(RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1)  
+ 

WT  MT
RT

; (173)
lT 1 =   (1  )RT 1kT 1  MT 1   kT
WT 1
: (174)
At time T   2, the decision rules of the agent at T   1 are integrated as constraints for the
consumers problem at T   2. Thus, the optimization problem can be dened as
max
kT 1
UT 2 = u(cT 2; lT 2) + u(cT 1; lT 1) + 2u(cT ; lT ) s:t (175)
ct = Rtkt +Wtlt  Mt   kt+1 for t = T   2; T   1
cT = cT = RT kT +WT lT  MT
with (169),(173) and (174): (176)
The rst-order conditons are
@UT 1
@kT 1
=   
RT 2kT 2 +WT 1lT 2  MT 2   kT 1 + (177)

0BBBBBBBBBBB@

0BB@
Az }| {
RT 1 +WT 1
@lT 1
@kT 1
  @kT
@kT 1
1CCA
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1   kT| {z }
B
 
(1  ) @lT 1@kT 1
1  lT 1| {z }
C
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
+ (178)
2
0BBBBBBBBBBB@

0BB@
Dz }| {
RT
@kT
@kT 1
+WT
@lT
@kT 1
1CCA
RT kT +WT lT  MT| {z }
E
 
(1  ) @lT@kT 1
1  lT 1| {z }
F
:
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
;
@UT 1
@kT 1
=
WT 2
RT 2kT 2 +WT 2lT 2  MT 2   kT 1  
1  
1  lT 2 : (179)
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Notice that when (174) is put into (173),
kT =

+ 
(RT 1kT 1 +WT 1lT 1  MT 1)  
+ 

WT  MT
RT

=

1 + 
(RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1)  1
1 + 

WT  MT
RT

:
Using this fact,
A = RT 1   (1  )

RT 1   @kT
@kT 1

  @kT
@kT 1
= 

RT 1   @kT
@kT 1

= 

RT 1   
1 + 
RT 1

=

1 + 
RT 1;
B = (RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1   kT );
C =
(1  )

 (1  )RT 1 
@kT
@kT 1
WT 1

1  + (1  )RT 1kT 1 MT 1 kTWT 1
=
 (1  ) 11+RT 1
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1   kT ;
D =

1 + 
RTRT 1   
1 + 
(1  )RTRT 1
=

1 + 
RTRT 1;
E = RT kT +WT

1  (1  )

1 +
RT kT  MT
WT

 MT
= RT kT +WT   (1  )WT   (1  ) (RT kT  MT ) MT
=  (RT kT +WT  MT ) ;
F =
 (1  ) 1+RTRT 1
RT kT +WT  MT :
Combining results from A to F, we can obtain

RT 2kT 2 +WT 1lT 2  MT 2   kT 1 =

1 + 
RT 1
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1   kT
+2

1 + 
RTRT 1
RT kT +WT  MT :
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Notice that
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1   kT = 1
1 + 
(RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1 + WT  MT
RT
);
RT kT +WT  MT = 
1 + 
RT (RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1 + WT  MT
RT
):
Then, (177) can nally be simplied as

RT 2kT 2 +WT 1lT 2  MT 2   kT 1 =
 
 + 2

RT 1
RT 1kT 1 +WT 1  MT 1 + WT MTRT
: (180)
From (180) and (179), the decision rules for the agent at time T   2 can be derived as
kT 1 =
 + 2
+  + 2
(RT 2kT 2 +WT 1lT 2  MT 2)  
+  + 2

WT 1  MT 1
RT 1
+
WT  MT
RTRT 1

;
Iteration of this process to time t gives us the law of motion of capital in proposition 10.
Proof of proposition 11 We nd out the raw of motion of capital in a nite-period horizon
as
kt+1 =

PT t
i=1 
i
+ 
PT t
i=1 
i
((1 k)rtkt+(1  l)wtlt Mt)  
+ 
PT t
i=1 
i
TX
i=t+1
 
(1   l)wi  Mi
ij=t+1(1  k)i trj
!
:
(181)
Conjecture that the saving rule in an innite-time period has a form of kt+1 = sAkt l
1 
t g
1 
t
and the labour choice is constant at l, which will be veried later. Using rt = Ak
 1
t l
1 
t g
1 
t ; wt =
A(1  )k 1t l t g1 t and Mt = (   k   (1  ) l) yt = 
yt
(1   l)wi  Mt+i
(1  k)i t
Qi
j=t+1 rj
=
1
(1  k)i t

1  

1   l
l
  



si (t+1)kt+1;
1X
i=t+1
(1   l)wi  Mt+i
(1  k)i t
Qi
j=t+1 rj
=

1  

1   l
l
  



kt+1
1X
i=t+1
si (t+1)
(1  k)i t
=

1  

1   l
l
  



1
1  k   skt+1:
Except for the last period, the labour choice rule is
lt =   (1  )Rtkt  Mt   kt+1
Wt
;
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so that l can be derived as
lt =   (1  ) (1  k)  
  s
(1  ) (1   l) lt
l =
 (1  ) (1   l)
(1  ) (1   l) + (1  ) [(1  k   s)  
] :
As T !1, (181) is converging to
kt+1 =

(1  ) +  ((1  k)rtkt + (1   l)wtlt  Mt) 
1  
(1  ) + 
(1  ) (1   l) + (1  )(1  k   s)  

 (1  k   s) kt+1
Since (1  k)rtkt + (1   l)wtlt  Mt = (1  )Akt l1 t g1 t ,
kt+1 =
 (1  k   s) (1  )
(1   + ) (1  k   s)+ (1  ) (1  ) (1   l)  (1  ) 
Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t :
Therefore, s should satisfy the following equation:
s =
 (1  k   s) (1  )
(1   + ) (1  k   s)+ (1  ) (1  ) (1   l)  (1  ) 
 : (182)
Finally we can obtain an equilibrium s as
s =

1   +  (1  k):
Proof of proposition 12 and 13 The central planners problem at time t is described as
Ut = u(ct; lt) + 
T tX
i=1
iu(ct+i; lt+i); 0 < ;  < 1 ,
kt+1 = (1  )yt   ct for t = t:::T   1
cT = (1  )yT
Since gt = yt,
yt = Ak

t l
1 
t g
1 
t
= A1=(1 )=l(1 )=t kt:
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At the nal period, the central planner only chooses the labour supply choice as
lT = :
At time T   1
max
kT
UT 1 = u(cT 1; lT 1) + u(cT ; lT 1) s:t (183)
cT 1 = (1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 1 kT 1   kT
cT = (1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T kT
The rst-order conditions are
1
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 1 kT 1   kT
=

kT
; (184)
1  

(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )= 1T 1 kT 1
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 1 kT 1   kT
=
1  
1  lT 1 (185)
From (184), the saving rule is
kT =

1 + 
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 1 kT 1; (186)
and by putting this result into (185),
lT 1 =
(1  )(1 + )
(1  )(1 + ) + (1  ) : (187)
At time T   2
max
kT 1
UT 2 = u(cT 2; lT 2) + u(cT 1; lT 2) + 2u(cT ; lT ) s:t (188)
ct = (1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=t kt   kt+1 for t = T   2; T   1
cT = (1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T kT and (186), (187)
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The rst-order conditions are
1
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 2 kT 2   kT 1
= 
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 1   @kT@kT 1
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 1 kT 1   kT| {z }
1=kT 1
(189)
+2
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T @kT@kT 1
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T kT| {z }
1=kT 1
;
1  

(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )= 1T 2 kT 2
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 2 kT 2   kT 1
=
1  
1  lT 2 : (190)
(185) can be simplied as
1
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 2 kT 2   kT 1
=
 
 + 2
 1
kT 1
;
and the saving rule for the central planner at time T   2 can be dened as
kT 1 =
 + 2
1 +  + 2
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=T 2 kT 2; (191)
and by putting this result into (190)
lT 2 =
(1  )(1 +  + 2)
(1  )(1 +  + 2) + (1  ) :
By repeating this process until the current period, t, we can obtain the saving and labour choice rules
as
kt+1 =

PT t
i=1 
i
1 + 
PT t
i=1 
i
(1  )A1=(1 )=l(1 )=t kt
lt =
(1  )(1 + PT ti=1 i)
(1  )(1 + PT ti=1 i) + (1  )
As T !1
kt+1 =

1   +  (1  )A
1=(1 )=l(1 )=t kt;
lt = lP =
(1  )(1   + )
(1  )(1   + ) + (1  )(1  ):
Proof of proposition 14 Dene a value-function for the current consumer at time 0 as
V0(k) =  ln((1  )f(k; l)  k0) + (1  ) ln(1  l) + V (k0);
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where
V (k) =  ln((1  )f(k; l)  k0) + (1  ) ln(1  l) + V (k0):
Let a stationery saving rate be s, such that kt+1 = s(1   )(1 )=A1=l(1 )=t kt. Since f(k; l) =
(1  )(1 )=A1=l(1 )=k;
ln ct = ln(1  s)(1  )(1 )=A1= + 1  

ln lt + ln kt
ln kt = ln s(1  )(1 )=A1= + 1  

ln lt + ln kt 1
lt = l =
(1  )
(1  )+ (1  )(1  s) : (192)
Combining these facts, V (k) can be expressed with repect to given parameter values and the saving
ratio, s as
V (k) =
1X
t=1
t [ ln ct + (1  )(1  lt)]
=

1  

ln(1  s)(1  )(1 )=A1= + 1  

ln l

+

(1  )2

ln s(1  )(1 )=A1= + 1  

ln l

+

1   ln k0 +
(1  )
1   ln
(1  )(1  s)
(1  )+ (1  )(1  s)
Finally, we can obtain the expression of V0(k) as
V0(k) =

1   + 
1  

ln(1  s) + 
(1  )2 ln s 
 (1  )
(1  )

1   +  + 
1  

+ (1  )

1   + 
1  

ln
0@ (1  )+
(1  )(1  s)
1A+  ;
where   is the collection of terms not including s.
It can be shown that there exists a unique s such that
s = arg max
s
V0(k),
and a closed-form of s is
s =

(1  )(1   + ) +  : (193)
By putting (193) into (192), the labour choice corresponding to this saving ratio in proposition can be
found.
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Proof of Proposition 17 Backward induction gives a current agent the saving decision
rule as
k1 =

(1  ) +  ((1  ~k)r0k0 + (1  ~ l)w0l0) 
(1  )
(1  ) + 
1X
i=1
(1   l)wi
ij=1(1  k)rj
; (194)
l0 =   (1  ) (1  ~k)r0k0   k1
(1  ~ l)w0 : (195)
Let s be a saving rule for all future selves such that kt+1 = sAkt l
1 
t g
1 
t . Then we al-
ready know that s = 1 + (1   k) and the labour choice for all future selves would be l =
(1 )(1  l)(1 +)
(1 )(1  l)(1 +)+(1 )(1 )(1 k) : The second term of the right-hand side in (194) can be rewritten
as
(1  )
(1  ) + 
1X
i=1
(1   l)wi
ij=1(1  k)rj
k1 =
(1  )
(1  ) + 
1  

1   l
1  k   s
1
l
k1
=
(1  )(1   l)(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )(1  k)
 (1  k) ((1  ) + ) k1:
Using this result, we can obtain the current period saving and labour choice rule in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 19 Let kt+1 = s2kt l1 t g1 t for t  2 and k2 = s1k1 l1 1 g1 1 .
From proposition 5 and 11, we know that
s1 = s0 [(1  )(1  ~ l) + (1  ~k)] ;
s2 =

1   +  (1  k);
where s0 = 1 k(1 )(1  l)+(1 k)

1 + : For the labour choice, it is known that
l1 =
(1  )(1  ~ l)
(1  )(1  ~ l) + (1  )(1  ~k   s1) ; (196)
lt = l =
(1  )(1   l)(1   + )
(1  )(1   l)(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )(1  k) for t  2. (197)
Competitive equilibrium in a nite-time period, T can be written as
k1 =

PT
i=1 
i
+ 
PT
i=1 
i
(R0k0 +W0l0)  
+ 
PT
i=1 
i
TX
i=1
Wi
ij=1Rj
: (198)
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The rst term in the right-hand side is converging to (1 )+ (R0k0 +W0l0). For the second term
of the right-hand side, notice that
TX
i=1
Wi
ij=1Rj
=
W1
R1
+
TX
i=2
Wi
ij=2Rj
:
Since W1R1 =
(1 ~ l)w1
(1 ~k)r1 =
(1 ~ l)
(1 ~k)
1 

k1
l1
and Wi
ij=2Rj
= (1  l)(1 k)i 1(1 ~k)
1 

si 22 s1k1
l
;
1X
i=1
Wi
ij=t+1Rj
=
(1  ~ l)
(1  ~k)
1  

k1
l1
+
1  

(1   l)
(1  ~k)
s1
1  k   s2
k1
l
: (199)
By putting (196) and (197) into (199), (198) can be simplied in the innite-time period as the equation
in proposition 13.
Derivation of (154) For convenience, let (1   )(1    l) = l, (1   k) = k, making
constraints from (150) to (152) simpler:
ct =

l +
1  
1   +  k

(1  l   k)(1 )= l(1 )=t kt;
lt =
(1   + )l
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k ;
kt+1 =

1   +  k (1  l   k)
(1 )=
l
(1 )=
t kt:
Then we can obtain
ln ct = ln

l +
1  
1   +  k

+
1  

ln (1  l   k)
+
1  

ln
(1   + )l
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k + ln kt:
Let S =
P1
t=1 
t ln kt.
S =

1  
0@ ln 1 + k (1  l   k)(1 )= +
1 
 ln
(1 +)l
(1 +)l+(1 )(1 )k
1A+  ln k0 + S
=

(1  )2
0@ ln k + 1  ln (1  l   k) +
1 
 ln
(1 +)l
(1 +)l+(1 )(1 )k
1A+  
U has two parts, one from consumption (U c) and the other from leisure (U l).
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Since U c = ln ct + 
P1
i=t+1 
i t ln ci,
U c =
1   + 
1  
0B@ ln

l +
1 
1 + k

+ 1  ln (1  l   k) +
1 
 ln
(1 +)l
(1 +)l+(1 )(1 )k
1CA
+

(1  )2
0@ ln k + 1  ln (1  l   k) +
1 
 ln
(1 +)l
(1 +)l+(1 )(1 )k
1A+  0
Since U l = ln(1  l0) + 
P1
i=t+1 
i t ln(1  lt);
U l =
1   + 
1   ln
(1   + )l + (1  )k
(1   + )l + (1  )(1  )k) + :
Derivation of (160) The current governments problem can now be dened as
max
~l;~k
U0 = u(c0; 1  l0) + 
1X
t=1
tu(ct; 1  lt);
subject to
k1 = s0(~l + ~k)(1  ~l   ~k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

0 k0;
c0 = (~l + ~k)(1  ~l   ~k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

0 k0   k1
= (1  s0)(~l + ~k)(1  ~l   ~k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

0 k0
l0 =
~l
~l + (1  )~k   s0(1  )(~l + ~k))
;
kt+1 =

1   +  k(1  l   k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

t kt for t  1;
ct = (l +
1  
1   +  k)(1  l   k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

t kt for t  1;
lt =
l(1   + )
l(1   + ) + (1  )(1  )k for t  1;
where s0 =

1 +
k
l+k
:
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Since for t  1
ln ct = ln kt +At
= ln k1 +A
0
t
= ln(~l + ~k) +
1  

(ln(1  ~l   ~k) + ln l0) +A00t ;
ln kt = ln kt 1 +Bt = ln k1 +B
0
t;
where At; A0t; A
00
t and Bt; B
0
t are collections of terms not including ~l; ~k. Using this fact
U c = ln c0 + 
1X
t=1
t ln ct
=

ln(~l + ~k) +
1  

(ln(1  ~l   ~k) + ln l0)

(1 +

1   ) +  :
=
0B@ ln(~l + ~k) + 1  (ln(1  ~l   ~k)+
ln(
~l
~l+(1 )~k s0(1 )(~l+~k) )
1CA (1 + 
1   ) +  ;
U l = ln(1  l0) + 
= ln(
~l + ~k
~l + (1  )~k   s0(1  )(~l + ~k)
) + ;
where   and  are collections of terms not including ~l; ~k. Then we can obtain the expression of
(160) from
U0 = U
c + (1  )U l:
Derivation of (167) and (168) Notice that U c = ln c0 + 
P1
t=1 
t ln ct. From the
competitive equilibrium, (161) to (166),
c0 = (
~l + (   )~k
~l + ~k
)(l + k)(1  l   k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

0 k0
c1 =
(1   + )l + (1  )k
(1   + )(l + k) (
~l + ~k)(1  ~l   ~k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

1 k1;
ct =
(1   + )l + (1  )k
1   +  (1  l   k)
1 
 A
1
 l
1 

t kt for t  2:
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Then
U c = ln(
~l + (   )~k
~l + ~k
) +  ln(~l + ~k) +
1  

ln(1  ~l   ~k) + (200)
1  

(ln l0 +  ln l1) + 
1X
t=1
t ln kt +  ;
where   is a collection of terms not including ~l and ~k. Since
 ln k1 =  ln ~k    ln

~l + ~k

+ 
1  

ln l0 +  ln k0 + Z1;
2 ln k2 = 
2 ln(~l + ~k) + 
2 1  

ln(1  ~l + ~k) + 2 1  

ln l1 + 
2 ln k1 + Z2;
3 ln kt = 
3 ln kt 1 + Z3 for t  3;
X
t ln kt =

1   ln
~k   
1   ln

~l + ~k

+
2
1   ln(
~l + ~k)

1  
1  

ln l0 +
2
1  
1  

ln l1 + ;
where  is a collection of terms not including ~l and ~k. Plugging this expression into (200), we can
obtain U c in (167).
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